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Tax Treatment of Prepublication Expenses of Authors and 
Publishers 
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code1 allows a deduction for 
a taxpayer's "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. Not all the 
costs incurred in the normal course of running a business are imme-
diately deductible, however. Rather, section 2632 of the Code denies 
a current deduction for those costs incurred in the creation or acqui-
sition of "property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxa-
ble year."3 Such costs must be capitalized rather than immediately 
deducted; they constitute the taxpayer's basis in the property and, if 
deductible at all, must be depreciated over the property's useful life.4 
Courts have reached different results when faced with the ques-
tion of whether the prepublication expenses of authors and publish-
ers must be capitalized pursuant to section 263, or whether such 
expenses are instead deductible under section 162.5 The production 
of a book or manuscript entails numerous research, travel, office and 
editing costs, all of which appear to be ordinary and necessary to the 
writing and publishing business. These costs are incurred, however, 
in the production of a book, an income-producing asset with a useful 
life beyond the taxable year. Thus, the taxpayer is asked to identify 
properly deductible business expenses in an industry that produces 
only capital assets.6 Denial of a present deduction could have a sig-
I. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982) provides in part: "(a) In General.-There shall be allowed as a 
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in 
carrying on any trade or business .... " 
2. I.R.C. § 263 (1982) provides in part: "(a) General Rule. - No deduction shall be al-
lowed for- (I) Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or 
betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate." 
3. Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-2(a) (1958). I.R.C. § 161 (1982) gives § 263 priority over § 162. 
Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. I, 17 (1974); Faura v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 849, 
851 (1980). 
4. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982) provides in part: "(a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a 
depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a 
reasonable allowance for obsolescence)- (I) of property used in the trade or business, or (2) of 
property held for the production of income." 
For taxable years ending after Dec. 31, 1980, I.R.C. § 168 provides an Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System (ACRS). Section 168 applies only to tangible property used in a trade or 
business or held for the production of income. I.R.C. § 168(c)(I) (1982). 
Not all property is depreciable. See note 18 iefra. 
5. Compare Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d 1359, 1365 (10th Cir. 1982) (author of book 
allowed to treat expenses as ordinary and necessary business expenses), and Faura v. Commis-
sioner, 73 T.C. 849 (1980) (same), with Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 
F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982) (publisher's prepublication expenses must be capitalized). 
6. Copyrights and manuscripts are not capital assets for purposes of the capital gains pro-
visions while in the author's hands. I.R.C. § 1221(3)(A) (1982); see notes 153-60 iefra and 
accompanying text. They are, however, potentially income-producing assets. 
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nifi.cant impact on small publishers and aspiring authors,7 yet al-
lowing all such expenses to be deductible against current income 
would not comport with accepted principles of capital accounting 
and tax treatment. The courts have so far failed to provide a well-
reasoned solution to this dilemma. 8 
This Note analyzes the tax treatment of prepublication costs. 
Part I presents the analytic framework of the business ex-
pense/capital expenditure distinction and searches for practical, in-
come-reflecting criteria that achieve theoretically correct results. 
Part II covers the historic treatment of prepublication expenditures, 
concluding that neither the courts nor the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) have been consistent in their approach and that both have 
largely ignored the income-reflecting goals outlined in Part I. Part 
III applies the income-reflecting approach in order to develop a prin-
cipled method of examining the tax consequences of various prepub-
lication expenses. 
I. THEORETICAL GROUNDS FOR DISTINGUISHING CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURES FROM BUSINESS EXPENSES 
Basic tax principles require the matching of costs with the income 
produced by those costs. This effort to reflect clearly the taxpayer's 
actual income in any given year underlies the distinction between 
capital expenditures and business expenses.9 Unfortunately, the 
practical criteria that the IRS and the courts have developed to clar-
ify the business expense/capital expenditure distinction contain de-
fects that render those criteria unworkable. In particular, judicial 
attempts to clarify the distinction by resorting to section 162's "ordi-
7. A current deduction benefits the taxpayer by sheltering current income. Because current 
income is more valuable to the taxpayer than the right to equal income in the future, the 
current deduction is worth more than future deductions that shelter the same total amount. 
See STAFF OF THE JolNT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 94TH CoNo., 2D 
SESS., TAX SHELTER INVESTMENTS 6 (Comm. Print 1976); 1975 Wis. L. REV, 230,231 & n.4. 
Authors and small publishers often face particularly difficult economic circumstances and 
are therefore particularly likely to be affected by changes in tax policy. On the difficulty of 
making a living as an author, see COLE, KINGSTON & MERTEN, THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
SURVEY OF AMERICAN AUTHORS (median income of Authors' Guild members was $4800 per 
year), cited in PuBLISHERS WEEKLY, June 26, 1981, at 18; Doebler, The Book Industry, 1981: 
From "Business as Usual" to ??? in BOOK INDUSTRY TRENDS 1981 (J. Dessauer ed. 1981) 
(discussing the same survey). Small publishers, though generally underfinanced, fill an impor-
tant role in the industry, putting out many of the the most innovative and specialized books on 
the market. See L. COSER, C. KAoUSHIN & W. POWELL, BOOKS: THE CULTURE AND COM· 
MERCE OF PUBLISHING 44-45 (1982); McDowell, For Publishing, /New York/ Retains Role as 
'the Mecca', N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1983, at 16, col. 1 (quoting editor-in-chief of Doubleday 
Bros. publishing company: "most recent initiatives in the book world had come . . . from 'the 
rash of small, underfinanced but inventive publishers on the West Coast and elsewhere' "); cf. 
Doebler,supra, at 19-20 (empirical evidence that new, small publishing firms are unprofitable), 
8. See Part II infra. 
9. See Part I-A infra. 
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nary and necessary" requirements have proven unsuccessful. Io 
Moreover, the IRS's "useful life beyond the taxable year" standard, 
although theoretically defensible, is beset by administrative 
problems. Ultimately, the courts' analysis of "clear reflection of in-
come" principles leads to the conclusion that only in this concept can 
legitimate judicial instruction be found. I I 
A. The Conceptual Framework 
The basic goal of the Internal Revenue Code's provisions is to 
determine accurately the taxpayer's actual income. I2 Fundamental 
principles of timing in both accounting and taxation serve this goal 
by requiring that deductions be taken and income realized in the 
years to which they are properly attributable.I3 The business ex-
pense/capital expenditure distinction follows logically from these 
timing principlesI4 : section 263 prevents the current deduction of 
costs properly attributable to later years. Is 
Capital expenditures are not attributable to the current year be-
cause the taxpayer's wealth has not yet been decreased. Sums paid 
out to create, purchase, or improve propertyI6 do not represent true 
costs in that year because the taxpayer gains property the value of 
which is presumably at least equal to the sums expended. 17 However, 
if the asset acquired is subject to exhaustion,I8 use of the asset over a 
IO. See Part I-B iefra. 
l l. See Part I-C iefra. 
12. See I.R.C. § 446 (1982) (requiring that taxable income be computed under a method of 
accounting that clearly reflects income). See generally M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 7-l l (3d ed. 1982) (discussing the scope of "income" for tax purposes). 
13. See I.R.C. § 451 (1982) (requiring that items of gross income be included in the taxable 
year in which they are properly accounted for); I.R.C. § 461 (1982) (requiring same treatment 
for deductions); H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING: INTRODUCTORY 33, 
103 (G. Johnson & J. Gentry 8th ed. 1980) (accounting principles require recognition of reve-
nue in period earned and matching of expenses with revenue). 
14. See ¥- CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 6.02, at 104. 
15. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. I, 16 (1974). The taxpayer in Idaho Power 
had taken depreciation deductions for certain equipment used in the construction of buildings 
for its own business. The Commissioner disallowed these deductions on the ground that de-
preciation of equipment is part of the cost of constructing a capital asset, and therefore must be 
capitalized. The Court upheld the Commissioner's deficiency determination. 
16. Despite the literal meaning of§ 263's language (quoted at note 2 supra), the provision 
is given a broad interpretation that encompasses the creation, purchase or improvement of any 
type of property. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 6.02, at 104. , 
17. In effect, one asset has been converted into another. See Kahn,Acce/erated f}eprecia-
tion - Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance far Measuring Net Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. I, 
13 (1979). 
18. Some items, such as goodwill and unimproved land, are not ~ubject to exhaustion, and 
therefore are not depreciable. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § J.l67(a)-2 (1956) (no depreciation de-
duction allowed for unimproved land, which cannot be exhausted); Treas. Reg. § J.l67(a)-3 
(1956) (intangible assets must have a "limited useful life" in order to be depreciable). Because 
the taxpayer incurs no cost in using property that cannot be exhausted, no deduction should be 
allowed either for purchase or for use. The cost of assets not subject to depreciation may be 
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period of time represents a genuine cost to the taxpayer. 19 Deprecia-
tion is the accounting device that recognizes the "true cost"20 of use, 
thus spreading the real cost of using the asset over the periods in 
which the asset benefits the taxpayer.21 
The denial of an immediate deduction for capital expenditures is, 
therefore, a basic principle of income taxation, not simply a technical 
statutory requirement.22 Capital expenditures, rather than being ex-
penses of the current year, represent an investment in property with a 
useful life of more than one year. 23 The costs of this property will be 
allocable to future years during which the property produces in-
come.24 In contrast, section 162 business expenses are costs properly 
allocable to the present year, because their benefit is almost immedi-
ately "used up."25 Thus, the theoretically sound approach to distin-
guishing business expenses from capital expenditures is to determine 
the characterization that matches costs with income produced and 
that therefore clearly reflects the taxpayer's actual income.26 
B. .Distinctions Based on the .Definition of "Business Expense" 
In an effort to avoid the case-by-case determinations that the 
"clear reflection of income" standard would require, the courts and 
the IRS have repeatedly sought more practical, objective criteria. 
One such criterion has been the statutory requirement that expenses 
be both "ordinary" and "necessary" in order to qualify for deduction 
under section 162.27 The definition of "necessary" has presented lit-
recovered only upon their sale or other disposition. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, 
~ 6.02, at 104. 
19. 2 A.P.B. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES: ACCOUNTING TERMINOLOGY BULLETIN No. I -
REVIEW AND RESUME~ 48, at 9512 (1973) (quoted in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 
U.S. 1, 10 n.7 (1974)). 
20. Calculation of the "true cost" of use is by no means a sellled subject among tax com-
mentators. Section 167 provides several methods for calculating depreciation; in some situa-
tions § 168 requires that an "accelerated" method be employed. For the debate over the 
"proper'' assessment of "true cost,'' compare M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~~ 6.07(d)-6.08, 
at 132-40 (arguing that "sinking fund" depreciation represents true economic cost), with Kahn, 
supra note 17, at 30-43 (arguing that accelerated depreciation measures cost at least as accu-
rately as does any other method of depreciation). 
21. See H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, supra note 13, at 287; Kahn, supra note 17, at 13-14. 
22. Gunn, The Requirement That A Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 
B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 443,450 (1974). 
23. See l B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS~ 20.4.1, at 
20-65 (1981). 
24. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text. 
25. See H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, supra note 13, al 104; cf. Treas. Reg.§ l.446-l(a)(4)(ii) 
(1960) (requiring classification of expenditures as either capital or expense; expenditures for 
items with useful life beyond taxable year are capital). 
26. See l B. BITTKER, supra note 23, ~ 20.4.1, at 20-64 to -67; Gunn, supra note 22, at 452. 
27. Expenses must satisfy each of these requirements; that is, the expenses must be both 
"necessary" and "ordinary." Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Assn., 403 U.S. 345, 353 
(1971); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933). 
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tle interpretive difficulty.28 However, the concept of "ordinary" ex-
penses has been less susceptible of easy definition. Justice Cardozo's 
now- classic formulation reveals the problematic nature of the term: 
"The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a 
way· of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the 
riddle."29 Subsequent interpretation refined Justice Cardozo's "rid-
dle" to a "recurrent in the industry" test, 30 under which an expense, 
though unique in the course of one taxpayer's lifetime, is currently 
deductible if at least a "normal" business response, given the tax-
payer's circumstances and line of business.31 This approach, how-
ever, fails to provide guidance in specific situations, because it 
merely shifts the ambiguity from "ordinary" to "recurrent" or "nor-
mal." Furthermore, an expense can often be made to seem "recur-
28. In Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), the Court concluded that a taxpayer at-
tempting to establish the necessity of an expense need only show that the expense was "appro-
priate and helpful" to his business. 290 U.S. at 113. Although this standard is no more precise 
than "necessary" (though apparently broader), the courts have avoided the problem of making 
fine distinctions by accepting the taxpayer's business judgment of the necessity of the expendi-
ture in question. 290 U.S. at 113 (''we should be slow to override [the businessman's] judg-
ment"); see also Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 551 F.2d 599, 605 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(expense is ordinary if" 'a hard-headed businessman, under the circumstances, would have 
incurred the expense'") (quoting Tulia Feedlot, Inc. v. United States, 513 F.2d 800, 804 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975)); Co=ent, Business Expenses, .Disallowance, and Public 
Policy: Some Problems of Sanctioning With the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 113 
n.20 (1962). 
29. Welch, 290 U.S. at 115. Justice Cardozo's full statement, though often quoted see, e.g., 
Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Assn., 403 U.S. 345,353 (1971); Faura v. Commisioner, 
73 T.C. 849,852 (1980); 4A J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION§ 25.09, at 
42-43 (J. Doheny ed., rev. 1979)), is hardly a model of clarity. Still, his observations help 
explain why the distinction between capital expenditures and business expenses can be so 
elusive: 
Now, what is ordinary, though there must always be a strain of constancy within it, is 
none the less a variable affected by time and place and circumstance. Ordinary in this 
context does not mean that the payments must be habitual or normal in the sense that the 
same taxpayer will have to make them often. A lawsuit affecting the safety of a business 
may happen once in a lifetime. The counsel fees may be so heavy that repetition is un-
likely. None the less, the expense is an ordinary one because we know from experience 
that payments for such purpose, whether the amount is large or small, are the co=on 
and accepted means of defense against attack. . . . At such times there are norms of 
conduct that help to stabilize our judgment, and make it certain and objective. The in-
stance is not erratic, but is brought within a known type . 
. . . Here, indeed, as so often in other branches of the law, the decisive distinctions are 
those of degree and not of kind. One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will 
supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is 
rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle. 
Welch, 290 U.S. at 113-15. 
30. See Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940) ("Ordinary has the connotation of 
normal, usual or customary. To be sure, an expense may be ordinary though it happen [sic] 
but once in the taxpayer's lifetime. Yet the transaction which gives rise to it must be of com-
mon or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved.") (emphasis supplied). 
31. More modem cases generally do not apply this "recurrent" test, opting instead to con-
trast "ordinary" with "capital." See notes 33-37 iefra and accompanying text. One exception 
to this trend has been Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 
1982), in which the court applied a "recurrent to the taxpayer" standard. See notes 125-27 
iefra and accompanying text. 
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rent" if it is examined in a broad enough context. 32 
The most pervasive modem approach for distinguishing "ordi-
nary" expenses contrasts ordinary business expenses with capital ex-
penditures. 33 In Commissioner v. Tellier, 34 the Supreme Court 
32. See 1 B. B!TTKER, supra note 23, ~ 20.3.2, at 20-47: 
The Hometown Bank of Sauk Center may be the first in its neck of the woods to distribute 
bubble gum to kiddies whose parents open new accounts, but it is probably not the first 
bank in America to do so; and if, mirabile dictu, no other American bank ever thought of 
the idea, the Sauk Center bank is assuredly not the first American business to peddle its 
wares in a lurid or undignified manner. 
- 33. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Assn., 403 U.S. 345,353 (1971); Com• 
missioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966). 
Courts have taken other approaches to the "ordinary" standard. Unfortunately, these ap• 
proaches do little to enhance understanding of the "ordinary" standard and nothing to refine 
the business expense/capital expenditure distinction. 
First, in a misguided attempt to disallow deductions for unusual expenditures, courts have 
contrasted "ordinary" expenses with those that are "extraordinary." See, e.g., Goede! v. Com• 
missioner, 39 B.T.A. I (1939) (stock dealer denied deduction for premiums paid for insurance 
on life of the President, whose death he feared would disrupt the stock market); Trebilcock v. 
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 852 (1975) (deduction for cost of minister's services in rendering busi-
ness advice denied, where minister used prayer rather than business skill), ajfd. mem., 557 F.2d 
1226 (6th Cir. 1977). The tax law, however, should not penalize a taxpayer for creativity. 
"There is no sound reason to deny a deduction merely because the taxpayer is unusually imag• 
inative or innovative .... " I B. BITTKER,supra note 23, ~ 20.3.2, at 20-47. Section 162 itself 
sets up a number of filters through which an expense must pass to be deductible. The expense 
must be (I) "paid or incurred during the taxable year,'' (2) for "carrying on any trade or 
business,'' (3) an "expense," and (4) an "ordinary and necessary" expense. See Commissioner 
v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Assn., 403 U.S. at 352. Legislation, rather than a judicial doctrine of 
"extraordinariness,'' should be required to disallow expenses that successfully pass through 
these filters. 
Second, courts have used the "ordinary" standard to deny deductions for personal expenses 
on the ground that they are not the "normal" response of businessmen. See Brown v. Com-
missioner, 446 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1971) (president of coffee company denied deduction for cost 
of safari to coffee-growing countries where trip not necessary to his continued employment, 
even though trip contributed to his reputation as a coffee expert); Greenspon v. Commissioner, 
229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956) (corporation's "promotional" expenses in creating "horticultural 
show place" at home of president and majority shareholder were not ordinary where primary 
benefit appeared to be enhancing value of president's home); Henry v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 
879 (1961) (tax lawyer's expenses in maintaining yacht on which he flew pennant emblazoned 
with "1040" were not deductible where promotional purpose was subsidiary to personal pur-
pose). Although the results in these cases may be correct, they could just as easily have been 
achieved by relying on I.R.C. § 262 (1982), which denies a deduction for personal expendi-
tures. 
Third, courts have used the "ordinary and necessary" standard to deny deductions whose 
allowance "would frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular 
types of conduct .... " Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33 (1958). 
Legislation has largely supplanted this doctrine by disqualifying specified expenditures. See 
I.R.C. § 162(c), (f), (g) (1982). 
Finally, a "reasonable in amount" qualification has been imputed to the "ordinary" stan• 
dard. See Commissioner v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 176 F.2d 815, 817 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 
U.S. 949 (1949). This qualification, however, adds little to the "ordinary" standard, since often 
the best evidence of reasonableness is that the amount was actually paid in an arm's length 
transaction. q: M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 6.04, at 117 (question of "reasonableness" 
arises only in situation where parties to transaction are related in some way). 
The erroneous manner in which courts have applied the term "ordinary" suggests that, by 
itself, "ordinary" does not provide an adequate means of distinguishing capital expenditures 
from business expenses. 
34. 383 U.S. 687 (1966). 
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stated: 
The principal function of the term "ordinary" in section 162(a) is to 
clarify the distinction, often difficult, between those expenses that are 
currently deductible and those that are in the nature of capital expend-
itures, which, if deductible at all, must be amortized over the useful life 
of the asset.35 
Although ordinary business expenses are certainly deductible imme-
diately, and capital expenditures just as certainly are not, the term 
"ordinary" hardly clarifies this distinction. Since section 263 already 
prohibits immediate deduction of capital expenditures, 36 reading 
"ordinary" to have the same effect amounts to saying that "business 
expenses are those costs which are not capital expenditures" - a 
true enough statement, but not one that illuminates the difference 
between the two concepts. 37 
If "ordinary" expense functions only as a contrast to "capital ex-
penditure," then section 162 expenses can be defined only by refer-
ring to the definition of section 263 capital expenditures. The 
provisions are, in effect, two sides of the same coin: definition of one 
implies definition of the other. The search for a useful standard must 
therefore turn to the meaning of the term "capital expenditure." 
C. .Distinctions Based on the .Definition of "Capital Expenditure" 
Neither the Code nor the Regulations define the term "capital 
expenditure."38 However, one criterion, adopted in the Regula-
tions39 and applied by many courts,40 requires that the costs of ac-
35. 383 U.S. at 689-90 (citation omitted). 
36. By its terms, § 263 prohibits "any" deduction for capital expenditures (see note 2 
supra), apparently including future deductions for depreciation. Such a reading, however, 
would clearly conflict with the theory of capitalization, which denies a deduction in the present 
year because the costs represented are attributable to, and should be deducted in,future years. 
See notes 14-21 supra and accompanying text. 
37. Bittker observes that "[v]iewed as a prohibition against deductions for capital expendi-
tures, however, the phi'ase 'ordinary and necessary' is a handkerchief thrown over something 
that is already covered by a blanket." l B. BITIKER, supra note 23, ~ 20.3.2, at 20-43 (footnote 
omitted). 
38. See I.R.C. § 263 (1982) and Regulations promulgated thereunder; cf. Gunn, supra note 
22, at 448 ("The only apparent function of section 263 in the statutory scheme is to provide a 
heading under which the tax services can list the capital expenditure cases.") (commenting on 
the lack of definition within § 263). 
39. Treas. Reg.§ l.263(a)-l(b) (1958) provides in part that capital expenditures: 
include amounts paid or incurred (l) to add to the value, or substantially prolong the 
useful life, of property owned by the taxpayer, such as plant or equipment, or (2) to adapt 
property to a new or different use. Amounts paid or incurred for incidental repairs and 
maintenance of property are not capital expenditures . . . . 
Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-2 (1958) provides in part: 
The following paragraphs [of this section) include examples of capital expenditures: 
(a) The cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings, machinery and 
equipment, furniture and fixtures, and similar property having a useful life substantially 
beyond the taxable year. 
(b) Amounts expended for securing a copyright and plates, which remain the property 
of the person making the payments. • · 
544 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:537 
quiring or constructing "property having a useful life substantially 
beyond the taxable year" be treated as capital expenditures.41 This 
"useful life"42 test is theoretically defensible as a generalization, for it 
guarantees capitalization of all expenditures that will produce bene-
fits in future taxable years.43 The "useful life" test is no more than a 
. generalization, however, because some payments that it characterizes 
as "capital" can be deducted immediately without distorting 
income.44 
Although strict application of the "useful life" standard will usu-
ally reflect taxpayers' actual income, this achievement must be 
weighed against the massive administrative problems that this ap-
proach poses.45 The courts and the IRS have responded to these 
problems in varying ways. The IRS has issued regulations designed 
to ease the accounting burden by allowing immediate deduction of 
various minor purchases.46 The courts have reacted either by look-
ing at the "clear reflection of income" principles that underlie the 
"useful life" test47 or by rejecting the ''useful life" test in favor of a 
"separate and distinct asset" formulation.48 
Several courts that have looked behind the "useful life" test base 
their capitalization decisions on "clear reflection of income" princi-
ples.49 These cases hold that capitalization is simply a method of 
40. See, e.g., Colorado Springs Natl. Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1191-92 (10th 
Cir. 1974). 
41. Treas. Reg. § I.263(a)-2(a) (1958). 
42. Note that "useful life," both in the context of capitalization and of depreciation, means 
the period during which the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to the taxpayer in 
his business or in the production of income. Treas. Reg.§ 1.167(a)-l(b) (1956). In other words, 
the asset's useful years are those in which it produces a benefit. This period may be considera-
bly shorter than the physical life of the asset. See Kahn, supra note 17, at 15. 
43. Indeed, this criterion is little more than a tautology; to say that the useful life of the 
property extends beyond the present year is to say that the property produces benefits in future 
years. See note 42 supra. 
44. See notes 56-59 iefra and accompanying text. 
45. For example, virtually every salary and advertising expense would have to be divided 
between its immediate impact on the customer and its long-term contribution to the company's 
goodwill. See l B. BtTIKER, supra note 23, ~ 20.4.1, at 20-67. Further, many relatively minor 
purchases would have to be capitalized, creating an accounting burden for the taxpayer not 
justified by the relatively small increase in accuracy in the determination of income. See Cin-
cinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 572 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Gunn, supra 
note 22, at 457. 
46. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-3 (1958) (manufacturer allowed to deduct cost of incidental 
materials and supplies if inventories and records of consumption are not kept); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.162-6 (1958) (professionals allowed to deduct cost of "books, furniture, and professional 
instruments and equipment, the useful life of which is short"); Treas. Reg.§ l.162-12(a), T.D. 
7198, 1972-2 C.B. 166, 167 (farmers allowed to deduct the cost of "ordinary tools of short life 
or small cost"). 
47. See notes 49-59 iefra and accompanying text. 
48. See notes 60-64 iefra and accompanying text. 
49. See Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Coors 
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 368, 392-98 (1973), ajfd. sub nom. Adolph Coors Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 519 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); Electric & Neon v. 
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accounting for assets.50 Under this approach, section 263 must be 
read together with the accounting provisions of section 446.51 Thus, 
in Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pac!fic Railway v. United 
States,52 the Court of Claims clearly rejected a strict reading of sec-
tion 263 in favor of the income-reflecting principles of section 446: 
[T]he conclusiveness of the one year rule, simply does not square with 
basic philosophy concerning asset accounting as reflected in the regula-
tions and in [section 446] .... The determinative question, therefore, 
is not what is the useful life of the asset in question, although that 
inquiry is relevant, but does the method of accounting employed 
clearly reflect income.53 
In effect, the Court of Claims concluded that capitalization of all 
capital expenditures, which section 263 seems to require, is inconsis-
tent with the income-reflecting goal that section 263 is designed to 
serve. 54 Thus, the court concluded that some costs that are capital in 
nature need not be capitalized, so long as income will still be clearly 
reflected.55 
A finding that a particular taxpayer's method of accounting does 
clearly reflect income may be based on either theoretical or practical 
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1324, 1331-34 (1971), ajfd., 496 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1974); Alabama 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 635, 657-58 (1969); Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. 
275, 283-84 (1967); Gunn, supra note 22, at 462 ("That there is an increasing tendency to 
regard capitalization questions as clear reflection of income problems seems evident."). 
50. The argument runs as follows: I.R.C. § 446(e) requires that the Commissioner consent 
to any change in the taxpayer's method of accounting. Treas. Reg.§ l.446-l(e)(2)(ii)(a), T.D. 
7073, 1970-2, C.B. 98, 99, states that a change in method includes "a change in the treatment of 
any material item" and defines "material item" as "any item which involves the proper time 
for the inclusion of the item in income or the taking of a deduction." On its face, this language 
includes all purchases that must be either expensed or capitalized. Treas. Reg. § l.446-
l ( e)(2)(ii)(b) specifically recognizes that a change in the treatment of a class of assets from 
expensing to capitalization is a change in the method of accounting. Thus, if a change in 
capitalization practice is a change in accounting methods, capitalization must itself be a 
method of accounting. 
Reliance on the accounting provisions of the Regulations in interpreting the Code sections 
dealing directly with expenditures may seem odd, since the accounting provisions generally do 
not interfere with the operation of other Code provisions that deal specifically with timing 
questions. See Gunn, supra note 22, at 453. However, the Court of Claims squarely rejected 
the government's contention on this point, and Gunn admits that what authority exists sup-
ports the direct use of the accounting provisions in dealing with capitalization. See Cincinnati, 
N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 568-69 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Gunn, supra note 22, 
at 453. 
51. Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. 275, 283 (1967) (§§ 263 and 446 are "inextricably 
intertwined"); see also Cincinnati, N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 
1970) (citing Fort Howard). 
52. 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970). The railroad, in compliance with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission's accounting requirements, had followed the ICC's "minimum rule" of expensing 
all purchases of property (other than track) of less than $500 each. The IRS disallowed ex-
pense deductions for the items costing more than $100 each. 
53. 424 F.2d at 568. 
54. See Gunn, supra note 22, at 454-55. 
55. 424 F.2d at 573; Ward, Tax Postponement and the Cash Method Farmer: An Analysis of 
Revenue Ruling 75-172, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 1119, I 164 (1975). 
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grounds.56 For theoretical reasons, accountants and concerned reg-
ulatory agencies may have agreed that the chosen method generally 
produces no distortion of income, a conclusion that the courts may 
or may not accept. 57 As a practical matter, the accounting method 
may produce no significant distortion either because the taxpayer is 
in a steady state58 or because the distortion is small in relation to the 
taxpayer's total income.59 When confronted with either practical or 
theoretical considerations, courts relying on the "clear reflection of 
income" goal must examine costs on a case-by-case basis in order to 
determine whether capitalization is required. 
The problems posed by the "useful life" test and the exceptions 
created to deal with those problems have led other courts to find that 
an extended useful life is not decisive. 60 In Commissioner v. Lincoln 
Savings & Loan Assn. , 61 the Supreme Court found that "the presence 
56. See Gunn, supra note 22, at 455. In Cincinnati Ry., the court based its approval of the 
taxpayer's method of accounting on both of these grounds. The "minimum rule" had been 
accepted by both accountants and the Interstate Commerce Commission as a method of ac-
counting that clearly reflected income. 424 F.2d at 565, 569-70. Further, the amounts ex-
pensed were fairly similar to the amount of depreciation that would have been allowed had the 
costs been capitalized. 424 F.2d at 571-72. Finally, any distortion created was small in relation 
to the railroad's total income. 424 F.2d at 571. 
57. This criterion simply shifts the burden of determining the appropriateness of a particu-
lar accounting method from the courts to accountants or regulatory agencies. Admittedly, 
such participants are likely to bring a greater degree of expertise to the problem. For criticism 
of excessive reliance on accountants' opinions, see Gunn, supra note 22, at 462-65. 
Neither the determinations of regulatory agencies nor generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples are binding on the courts, although they may be persuasive. See, e.g., Commissioner v. 
Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. at 15 (''where a taxpayer's generally accepted method of accounting 
is made compulsory by the regulatory agency and that method clearly reflects income, it is 
almost presumptively controlling of federal income tax consequences") (emphasis in original) 
(footnote omitted); Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Assn., 403 U.S. at 355-56 (some 
significance accorded to agency-imposed accounting practices); American Automobile Assn. v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 687, 693 (1961) (generally accepted accounting procedures do not nec-
essarily reflect income so clearly as to be binding on the Treasury); Old Colony R.R. v. Com-
missioner, 284 U.S. 552, 562 (1932) (agency imposed accounting practices do not necessarily 
dictate tax consequences). 
58. A taxpayer is in a "steady state" during a given period if the taxpayer purchases and 
retires the same number of assets every year at a stable per-unit cost. Under these ideal condi-
tions, the amount of depreciation allowable in any year would exactly equal the expense of 
purchasing new assets in that year. Thus, income would be clearly reflected whether the assets 
were expensed or capitalized. See 1 B. BITIKER, supra note 23, ~ 23.1.2, at 23-7. 
59. Neither of these criteria provide a theoretical basis for distinguishing capital expendi-
tures and business expenses. Rather, they recognize that the characterization of particular costs 
will often be of little practical significance. However, the mere fact that the distinction will be 
practically unimportant in some situations does not provide a theoretical justification for char-
acterizing capital expenditures as business expenses in those situations. 
60. See Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Assn., 403 U.S. 345,354 (1971); Cincinnati, 
N.O. & T. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (purchases ofless than $500 
each for assets treated as operating expenses under ICC accounting rules can be deducted as 
ordinary business expenses); Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 526-27 (1976) (dictum: fee 
for license to practice law could have been deducted immediately, despite its capital nature, by 
analogy to deduction for inexpensive tools), qffd. per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), 
61. 403 U.S. 345 (1971). 
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of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not con-
trolling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective ef-
fect beyond the taxable year."62 Rather than rely on the "useful life" 
criterion, the Court enunciated an alternative test: "What is impor-
tant and controlling, we feel, is that the . . . payment serves to create 
or enhance . . . what is essentially a separate and distinct additional 
asset and that, as an inevitable consequence, the payment is capital 
in nature and not an expense, let alone an ordinary expense . . . ."63 
This "separate and distinct asset" standard is seriously flawed, how-
ever, because it bears little or no relation to the ideal of reflecting 
income. Nothing in the Lincoln Savings formulation requires that 
the asset be income-producing beyond the taxable year; in fact, 
many separate and distinct assets will be consumed within a single 
year.64 
The Supreme Court has more recently moved to a position that is 
apparently based on "clear reflection of income" principles. In Com-
missioner v. Idaho Power Co. ,65 the Court failed to cite the "separate 
and distinct asset" test handed down only two years earlier.66 
Rather, the Court relied on clear reflection of income principles in 
finding that depreciation on construction equipment was a cost that 
62. 403 U.S. at 354 (1971). Lincoln was a member of the FSLIC and as such required to 
pay insurance premiums into so-called Primary and Secondary Reserves. Insured institutions 
have no property interest in the Primary Reserve. They do, however, retain an interest in the 
Secondary Reserve; the "additional premium" paid into the Secondary Reserve is suspended 
when the aggregate of the two Reserves exceeds a certain level. Lincoln deducted both premi-
ums as ordinary business expenses. The Co=issioner allowed deduction of the Priinary pre-
mium, but disallowed the Secondary premium. The Tax Court held that the Secondary 
Reserve premium was a capital expenditure, deductible only when funds from the Secondary 
Reserve were used to pay Primary Reserve premiums or to meet actual losses of the FSLIC. 51 
T.C. 82 (1968), revd., 422 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1970). 
63. 403 U.S. at 354. 
64. For example, the costs of office supplies and of material properly included in inventory 
would have to be capitalized under this criterion. The test is too narrow, as well as too broad, 
because it fails to account for at least one type of commonly recognized capital expenditure: 
the cost of a professional education. The IRS and commentators agree that at least part of the 
cost of obtaining a professional education is business-related and hence represents a capital 
expenditure. See Treas. Reg.§ l.162-5(b)(l), T.D. 6918, 1967-1 C.B. 36, 37 (such expenditures 
"constitute an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital expenditures"); M. CHIRELSTEIN, 
supra note 12, ~ 6.02, at 112; Shaw, Education as an Ordinary and Necessary Expense in Carry-
ing on a Trade or Business, 19 TAX L. REV. l (1963); Wolfman, The Cost of Education and the 
Federal Income Tax, 42 F.R.D. 535 (1966). However, the education that results from this 
expenditure is not an "asset" in any usual sense of that term. Most definitions of "asset" refer 
to "property"; most definitions of "property" require at least that the item be transferable and 
that the "owner" have some degree of legal protection against interference by third parties. 
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 108, 1095 (5th ed. 1979); l B. BIITKER,supra note 23, ~ 20.4.1, 
at 20-67; Gunn, supra note 22, at 473; Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964). 
An education does not meet either of these requirements - by its very nature it can be neither 
transferred nor protected against interference. Thus, the capital expenditure for professional 
education does not create a separate and distinct asset. 
65. 418 U.S. l (1974); see note 15 supra. 
66. Lincoln Savings is cited only for the proposition that agency-imposed accounting prac-
tices may be accorded some significance. 418 U.S. at 15. 
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must be capitalized.67 Unlike the Court of Claims in Cincinnati Rail-
way, however, the Supreme Court did not expressly conclude that 
expenses that are capital in nature need not be capitalized if the tax-
payer's income will still be clearly reflected.68 In fact, the language 
used by the Court69 suggests that it views section 263 as mandating 
capitalization of all capital expenditures - i.e., costs related to the 
production of income in future years. Nevertheless, the Court in 
Idaho Power was not faced with a situation like the one in Cincinnati 
Railway, where the immediate deduction of a capital expenditure 
clearly reflected the taxpayer's income. By applying "clear reflection 
of income" principles in Idaho Power, the Court apparently ac-
knowledged the generalization that capital expenditures may not be 
immediately deducted, because in almost all cases income will be 
clearly reflected only by correlating the deduction with the future 
production of income. But the Court's reliance on income-reflecting 
principles itself implies that a cost ordinarily characterized as a capi-
tal expenditure might be treated as immediately deductible ff, as in 
Cincinnati Railway, the circumstances of the industry and of the in-
dividual taxpayer ensure that income will still be clearly reflected. 
The definition of "capital expenditure," then, is just as problem-
atic as that of "business expense." Many courts have determined 
that the IRS's "useful life" standard is not controlling.70 In its place, 
they have relied on the "clear reflection of income" principles under-
lying that standard.71 This judicial reliance has important implica-
tions. A given cost may be defined as a capital expenditure in that it 
goes to the creation or acquisition of property that will produce ben-
efits in future years. Yet capitalization of that expenditure should be 
required only where capitalization is necessary to reflect income ac-
curately. By and large, the rule that capital expenditures may not be 
currently deducted will comport with the principles underlying it. 
However, the rule should be discarded where "clear reflection of in-
come" principles do not require its application, and where adminis-
67. Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 13-14 (''The significant fact is that the exhaustion of construc-
tion equipment does not represent the final disposition of the taxpayer's investment in that 
equipment; rather, the investment in the equipment is assimilated into the cost of the capital 
asset constructed. . . . [T]his capitalization prevents the distortion of income that would 
otherwise occur .... "). In discussing the weight to be given agency-mandated practices, the 
Court concluded that a compulsory practice that clearly reflects income is "almost presump• 
tively controlling" of tax consequences, quoting§ 446 for support. 418 U.S. at 15 & n.10. 
68. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text. 
69. 418 U.S. at 16 ("The purpose of§ 263 is to reflect the basic principle that a capital 
expenditure may not be deducted from current income.") (emphasis added); see also Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Ida/10 
Power to require the capitalization of all capital expenditures). 
70. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. 
71. See notes 50-60 & 67-?0supra and accompanying text. 
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trative or other considerations militate against it. In such situations, 
the capital expenditure should be immediately deducted. 
II. HISTORIC TREATMENT OF PREPUBLICATION EXPENDITURES 
This part traces the historic treatment of prepublication expendi-
tures. Section A deals with the period before Revenue Ruling 73-
395 .72 Treatment during this time was confusing, to say the least. 
Although the IRS's Revenue Rulings required capitalization, it later 
acknowledged an exception for the research expenses of professors. 
Furthermore, the IRS apparently accepted a line of court cases al-
lowing authors an immediate deduction for their expenses. How-
ever, neither the Revenue Rulings nor the cases really addressed the 
problem of distinguishing capital expenditures from business 
expenses. 
In 1973, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 73-395, which clearly 
requires capitalization of prepublication expenditures. Section B 
discusses that ruling, as well as the congressional and judicial re-
sponse it produced, concluding that current treatment of the prepub-
lication expenses dilemma remains inadequate. 
A. Prepublication Expenses Before Revenue Ruling 73-395 
The IRS has long maintained that prepublication expenses are 
capital expenditures that may be recovered only through deprecia-
tion of the asset acquired.73 A 1922 ruling divides "expenses of pub-
lishing copyrighted books"74 into two categories: those that are 
essentially prepublication expenses75 and those arising from the ac-
72. 1973-2 C.B. 87. 
73. I.T. 1287, 1-1 C.B. 28 (1922). Co=entators have suggested that this ruling was only 
intended to cover the relatively insignificant costs of copyrighting a manuscript, and that in 
any case, the Co=issioner later allowed authors to deduct legitimate expenses. Shine, Some 
Tax Problems of Authors and Artists, l3 TAX L. REV. 439,446 (1958); Note,A Comparison of 
the Tax Treatment of Authors and Inventors, 10 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1422 n.26 (1957). These 
commentators all apparently rely on the line of cases discussed in notes 89-97 iefra and accom-
panying text. The language of I.T. 1286 suggests, however, that more than copyrighting costs 
were included. See note 75 iefra. For evidence that the IRS continues to require capitalization 
of prepublication expenses, see note 79 iefra and accompanying text. 
74. I.T. 1287, 1-1 C.B. 28 (1922). This phrase appears to encompass only publishers, since 
it refers only to expenses of publishing. However, the IRS apparently understood "publishing" 
to include the work of both publishers and authors. The first category of expenses, for exam-
ple, includes those for "producing and copyrighting" the manuscript, as opposed to those for 
publishing alone. See notes 75 & 76 iefra and accompanying text. Expenses for producing the 
text must surely encompass the author's prepublication expenditures as well as the publisher's 
development costs. 
75. What this Note refers to as "prepublication expenses" were referred to by the IRS as 
expenses "for producing and copyrighting the text .... " I.T. 1287, 1-1 C.B. at 28 (emphasis 
added). This language casts further doubt on the contention of some co=entators that the 
ruling applied only to copyrighting costs. See note 73 supra. For an argument that production 
and copyrighting costs should be treated separately, see Part III-A iefra. 
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tual printing of the manuscript.76 The latter costs are to be included 
in inventory and allocated among the books on hand on an aliquot 
basis.77 Expenditures "for producing and copyrighting the text" -
prepublication expenses - "represent the cost of a capital asset, 
which . . . may be returned to its owner through annual deprecia-
tion allowances . . . ."78 The IRS has continued to take this posi-
tion in its rulings and private letters,79 but until recently had failed to 
challenge a line of cases allowing authors an immediate deduction. 80 
The Commissioner did, however, argue that the research ex-
penses of professors are capital expenditures and hence not immedi-
ately deductible.81 In Brooks v. Commissioner,82 the IRS argued 
that where a scholar did not expect to realize present profit from the 
publication of research, the expenses represented an investment in 
future earning capacity and thus were capital expenditures. 83 The 
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument on the ground that the research 
was undertaken to maintain the scholar's position in the field, in the 
good faith belief that eventually the research would yield a profitable 
stipend from a foundation. 84 The IRS later accepted this position, at 
least to the extent that the expenses represent an investment in the 
researcher's reputation and cannot "be considered to have been in-
curred for the purpose of producing a specific income-producing 
asset."85 
This professorial exception cannot be justified on purely theoreti-
cal grounds. An investment in reputation is generally regarded as 
capital in nature, since good reputation produces future income.86 
76. I.T. 1287, I-1 C.B. 28 (1922). 
11. Id at 28. Books are inventory items for publishers. The costs of printing are produc-
tion costs that must be allocated to goods produced during the year. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.471-
ll(a), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163; note 108 i,!fra. This position has been consistently followed. 
See Rev. Ru!. 68-194, 1968-1 C.B. 87; Rev. Ru!. 73-395, 1973-2 C.B. 87. 
78. I.T. 1287, I-1 C.B. 28 (1922). 
19. See Rev. Ru!. 234, 1953-2 C.B. 29; Rev. Ru!. 68-194, 1968-1 C.B. 87; Letter Ruling 
5901135190A (Jan. 13, 1959). 
80. See text at notes 89-97 i,!fra. These cases dealt only with the questions of whether the 
taxpayer was in a trade or business at all and, if so, how much of his expense was business 
related and how much personal. The issue of distinguishing §§ 162 and 263 was never 
addressed. 
81. See Brooks v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1959); G.C.M. 11654, XII-I C.B. 
250 (1933); Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense, 112 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1089 (1964). 
82. 274 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1959). 
83. 274 F.2d at 98. 
84. 274 F.2d at 97-98. 
85. Rev. Ru!. 63-275, 1963-2 C.B. 85;see Faura v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 849,854 (1980) 
(Revenue Ruling 63-275 "approved deductibility of research expenses incurred by college and 
university professors in their capacity as educators"). Note that the IRS seems to be using 
something akin to the "separate and distinct additional asset" test discussed at notes 61-64 
supra and accompanying text. 
86. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933) (expenses to establish good business 
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The IRS was no doubt struggling with the problem that the business 
of professors includes the production of income-producing assets87 
- a problem confronting authors and publishers in general. Despite 
the limited exception for professors, however, the IRS has continued 
to hold that ordinary authors and publishers are subject to the capi-
talization requirement.88 
The Tax Court and Courts of Appeals, on the other hand, have 
consistently allowed the immediate deduction of prepublication ex-
penses of authors.89 In Doggett v. Burnett,90 the only case to deal 
with a publisher, the taxpayer was allowed an immediate deduction 
for the expenses of printing, advertising, and selling the works of a 
British religious teacher.91 Since the taxpayer expected in good faith 
to receive a present profit from the sale of the books, the court con-
cluded that the enterprise was a business92 and that the taxpayer's 
expenses were deductible under section 214(a)(l) of the Revenue Act 
of 1926,93 the predecessor of section 162.94 Doggett was followed by 
a number of Tax Court cases in which authors had claimed business 
expense deductions for travel, research and office costs associated 
with their business of writing.95 The only question debated in these 
reputation were capital expenditures). Expenses incurred to preserve an existing business rep-
utation may be deductible under § 162, but must be carefully distinguished from expenses 
related to personal reputation. See I B. BITIKER,supra note 23, ~~ 20.2.11, 20.4.7, at 20-35 to -
37, 20-86 to -87. 
87. The "publish or perish" mandate for university professors is a well-known fact of life 
in academia. Scholarly books, particularly textbooks, generally sell over a long period of time. 
L. CosER, C. KADUSHIN & w. POWELL, BOOKS: THE CULTURE & COMMERCE OF PUBLISHING 
57 (1982). For example, H.W. Janson's History of Ari (1967) sold nearly two million copies 
between 1967 and 1975. See G. KURIAN, THE DIRECTORY OF AMERICAN BOOK PUBLISHING 
53 (1975). In fact, when contrasted with the more transient realm of popular fiction and cur-
rent interest books, the college text and professional book segments of the publishing industry 
consistently rank as the most profitable. B. COMPAINE, THE BOOK INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION 
18-19 (1978). 
88. See note 79 supra. 
89. See, e.g., Brooks v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1959); Doggett v. Burnett, 65 
F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Faura v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 849, 852-55 (1980) (summarizing 
prior cases). The only exception to this rule has been Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982). This exception, however, was after Rev. Ru!. 73-395 
had been issued, See notes 121-24 infra and accompanying text. 
90. 65 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1933). 
91. 65 F.2d at 193-94. The court did not mention whether the t!lxpayer incurred expense 
for acquisition of the works. 
92. 65 F.2d at 194. 
93. Ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 26 (1926). 
94. 65 F.2d at 194. The Commissioner apparently did not argue that any of the taxpayer's 
expenses should be treated as capital expenditures. Since apparently none of the expenses 
dealt with were for acquisition or ed_iting, they were presumably either inventoriable produc-
tion costs or the daily expenses of running the business. 
95. Leona Anderson, 21 T.C.M. (P-H) ~ 52,107 (1952) (taxpayer in business of radio 
broadcasting entitled to deduction for cost of purchasing script); Kluckhohn v. Commissioner, 
18 T.C. 892 (1952) (newspaper correspondent allowed to deduct that portion of cost of wife's 
trip to Australia which was properly allocable to research for books and articles written by 
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cases was the extent to which the expenses deducted were truly busi-
ness, as opposed to personal, expenses.96 Both the Tax Court and 
the Commissioner apparently assumed that the portion of the ex-
penses related to business would be immediately deductible, and 
thus did not attempt to distinguish business expenses from capital 
expenditures.97 
B. Revenue Ruling 73-395 and the Response of Congress and the 
Courts 
The IRS eventually realized that it was undermining the capitali-
zation requirement by challenging authors' expense deductions 
solely on the ground that the expenses were really personal.98 The 
line of cases allowing immediate deduction culminated in 1971 with 
Stern v. United States ,99 which allowed a writer to deduct expenses 
incurred while researching, writing and arranging material for a por-
tion of a forthcoming book that was first published as a magazine 
article. 100 The IRS responded to Stern by issuing Revenue Ruling 
him); Freda W. Sandrich, 15 T.C.M. (P- H) ~ 46,082 (1946), amended, 15 T.C.M. (P-H) 
~ 46,144 (1946) (motion picture writer/producer/director allowed business deductions for por-
tion of pleasure trip which provided ideas for future movies, for business portion of automo-
bile and chauffeur expense, for payment to writer for movie script, and for business use of 
home); Eugene Delmar, 7 B.T.A.M. (P-H) ~ 38,155 (1938) (magazine writer allowed business 
deduction for business portion of trips to gather material and for business phone calls). 
96. For criticism of reliance on these cases as authority for treating prepublication ex-
penses as immediately deductible, see Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 
F.2d 212, 215 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he cases in question ... are inapposite, because they con-
sider only whether the author's expenditures are deductible at all - not whether, if they are 
deductible, they must first be capitalized."). 
Although these cases may deserve less precedential weight because they do not discuss 
capitalization, the Britannica court's criticism is unfair. Since the taxpayers in these cases had 
claimed business deductions that were disallowed as personal expenses, a finding of a business 
expense implied a reinstatement of the immediate deduction. The Tax Court assumed, and 
the Commissioner apparently did not disagree, that any expenses found to be legitimately 
business-related would be immediately deductible. Indeed, in most of these cases, the Com-
missioner had allowed a portion of the deduction originally claimed, simply disagreeing as to 
the amount which was genuinely business-related. See, e.g., Sandrich, 15 T.C.M. (P-H) 
~ 46,082 (1946). 
97. See note 96supra. 
98. In Stem v. United States, 27 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 71,546 (C.D. Cal. 1971), the IRS 
stipulated that if the taxpayer were found to be in the trade or business of writing, his expenses 
would be ordinary and necessary. 27 A.F.T.R.2d at 71-1148 to -1149. The IRS later charac-
terized this stipulation as "erroneous." Rev. Ru!. 73-395, 1973-2 C.B. 87, 88. 
99. 27 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) ~ 71,546 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
100. 27 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) at 71-1149. Although the plaintiff received no compensation for 
the article, he was to receive standard author's royalties upon publication of the book. The 
court could have based its decision either on the ground that the article produced no income 
(since the plaintiff received no compensation) or on the ground that the article's useful life was 
less than one year. Although the opinion does not tell us when the book was to be published, 
the article was presumably intended at least in part as publicity for the forthcoming book. As 
publicity, the article's useful life would be short. However, the court chose to rest its decision 
on the ground that the expenses were not "expenses for securing a copyright and plates," and 
hence were not capital expenditures. 27 A.F:T.R.2d at 71-1149. 
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73-395, 101 in which it stated that the IRS did not consider Stern con-
trolling and that the court's holding would not be followed as prece-
dent.102 The IRS reaffirmed its position on prepublication expenses, 
saying: 
Expenditures that are directly attributable to producing and copyright-
ing a manuscript of a literary composition by a taxpayer result in the 
creation of an asset having a useful life that extends substantially be-
yond the close of the taxable year and are thus capital in nature and 
not deductible for Federal income tax purposes.103 
On its face, this ruling applies to all writing, editing, illustrating and 
publishing costs short of the actual printing and binding of the 
book. 104 
Revenue Ruling 73-395 produced objections from the publishing 
industry. 105 These objections were heard in Congress, which enacted 
section 2119 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.106 Section 2119 relieves 
publishers107 from the effect of Revenue Ruling 73-395 and allows 
101. 1973-2 C.B. 87. 
102. 1973-2 C.B. at 88. 
103. 1973-2 C.B. at 87. Although the language of this passage is somewhat unclear, the 
text of the Ruling indicates that the IRS intended that it would apply to both publishers and 
authors. 
104. The costs of printing and binding are to be inventoried and apportioned on an aliquot 
basis to the books on hand at the end of the taxable year. Treas. Reg.§ 1.471-l (1956); Rev. 
Ru!. 73-395, 1973-2 C.B. 87. 
105. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (1975), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 
2) 695, 1029 ("Your committee has been made aware of the concerns of the publishing indus-
try as to whether Rev. Rul. 73-395 ... correctly interprets present law .... "). 
106. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2119, 90 Stat. 1520, 1912 (1976). 
107. By its terms, § 2119 applies only to expenses incurred by taxpayers in the "trade or 
business of publishing." § 2119(c). However, in Faura v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 849 (1980), 
the Tax Court concluded that§ 2119 applied to authors as well as publishers. The court noted 
the use of the pronoun "his" in the phrase "his trade or business of publishing," assuming that 
"its" would have been more appropriate had§ 2119 been addressed only to "corporate mem-
bers of the publishing industry." 73 T.C. at 859. Additionally, the Tax Court found the defini-
~ion of "business of publishing" broad enough to include "being the author of a published 
work." 73 T.C. at 859. This definition is so broad, however, as to eliminate the distinction 
between publishers and authors entirely - obscuring a line clearly drawn by the Senate in its 
deliberations. 
A more careful analysis of the legislative history makes it apparent that Congress intended 
§ 2119 in its final form to apply only to publishers. As originally passed by the House,§ 2119 
covered only "publishers." H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1306, 121 CONG. REC. 38,596, 
38,637 (1975) (§ 1306 of the Bill as passed by the House was renumbered § 2119 in the final 
version). That the Senate Committee did not consider the phrase "trade or business of pub-
lishing" to include authors is evident from its amendment of the section to read "trade or 
business of writing or publishing." H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1305, 122 CO!'!G- REC. 
24,015 (1976). In the Senate Report of the bill, the Finance Committee noted: 
[T]he committee believes that it would be discriminatory to allow publishers to deduct 
expenses which authors must capitalize. Therefore, the committee believes it appropriate 
to provide relief from Revenue Ruling 73-395 to authors, as well as to publishers. . . . 
The Committee amendment is substantially the same as the provision in the House bill 
except that it extends its application to authors. 
S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 404-05 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 49, 442-43 
(emphasis added). When the bill went to the Conference Committee, the Senate adopted the 
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them to continue treating prepublication expenses as they had in the 
past, at least until the IRS issues specific regulations. 108 Congress re-
quired only that the IRS deal with prepublication expenditures 
through regulations rather than revenue rulings; Congress did not 
express a preference for either capitalization or immediate 
deductibility. 109 
House version "with necessary technical changes." S. REP. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 502 
(1976), reprinted in 1916-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 806, 906. Although the Finance Committee version 
was never passed by the Senate (see note 109 infra) and thus was not before the Conference 
Committee, the Faura dissent points out that "the 'necessary technical changes' included ever)' 
change proposed by the Senate Finance Committee, except the change that would have added 
the words 'writing or.'" 73 T.C. at 865 (Chabot, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 938, at 
404-05) (emphasis in original). Thus, the conferees undoubtedly knew of the divergent lan-
guage; their choice of the House language points to their intent not to include authors within 
the purview of§ 2119. 
108. Section 2119 provides: 
(a) GENERAL RULE.-With respect to taxable years beginning on or before the date 
on which regulations dealing with prepublication expenditures are issued after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the application of sections 61 (as it relates to cost of goods sold), 
162, 174, 263, and 471 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to any prepublication ex-
penditures shall be administered-
( I) without regard to Revenue Ruling 73-395, and 
(2) in the manner in which such sections were applied consistently by the taxpayer to 
such expenditures before the date of the issuance of such revenue ruling. 
(b) REGULATIONS TO BE PROSPECTIVE ONLY.-Any regulations issued after the date 
of the enactment of this Act which deal with the application of sections 61 (as it relates to 
cost of goods sold), 162,174,263, and 471 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to pre-
publication expenditures shall apply only with respect to taxable years beginning after the 
date on which such regulations are issued. 
(c) PREPUBLICATION EXPENDITURES DEFINED.-For purposes of this section, the 
term "prepublication expenditures" means expenditures paid or incurred by the taxpayer 
(in connection with his trade or business of publishing) for the writing, editing, compiling, 
illustrating, designing, or other development or improvement of a book, teaching aid, or 
similar product. 
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1912 (1976). 
109. The Tax Court concluded in Faura v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 849 (1980), that§ 2119 
expressed congressional disapproval of the position taken in Rev. Ru!. 73-395 (j.e., that pre-
publication expenditures must be capitalized). 73 T.C. at 859-60. This conclusion is not sup-
ported by the legislative history. The Senate Committee did not approve of requiring authors 
to capitalize their expenses while publishers were allowed to deduct them. S. REP. No. 938, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 404 (1976), reprinted in 1916-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 49, 442 ("The Committee 
believes that the IRS's position to disallow any deductions for authors' prepublication ex-
penses ... results in inequitable treatment for taxpayers who are professional authors en-
gaged in the business of writing. The Committee believes authors should be allowed to deduct 
as business expenses the essential, reasonable costs of earning income from their writing.''), 
However, the Committee found that Senate support for any attack on Rev. Ru!. 73-395 was so 
slim that it withdrew the entire provision from Senate consideration. 122 CONG. REC. 24,019 
(1976). 
The House Report and the Report of the Joint Committee on Taxation indicate only a 
concern that retroactive application of a capitalization requirement to publishers who had con-
sistently been deducting their expenses immediately would be unfair. See H.R. REP, No. 658, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 337-38 (1975), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 695, 1029-30 ("Your com-
mittee understands that historically tax accounting practices in the publishing industry have 
varied greatly and no standard procedures have been developed . . . . [Y]our committee is 
concerned about the retroactive application of Rev. Ru!. 73-395 which would affect practices 
consistently followed by many taxpayers for years .... "); STAFF OF JOINT COMM, ON TAXA-
TION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 
624-35 (1976). Since the language of the House bill was followed, and the Joint Committee 
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Since the passage of section 21 I 9, the IRS has continued to re-
quire capitalization of prepublication expenditures, 110 despite sus-
pension of Revenue Ruling 73-395.111 Only publishers falling within 
the limited scope of section 2119 are exempt from this treatment. In 
private letters, the IRS has urged that publishers must show that they 
had established a consistent practice of expense deduction before the 
effective date of the statute. 112 Thus, new publishers and those pub-
lishers without a prior consistent practice113 are still subject to the 
IRS's interpretation of sections 162 and 263. 
In recent cases, the courts have split on the proper treatment of 
prepublication expenditures. In Faura v. Commisioner, 114 the Tax 
Court found that all prepublication expenditures of an author were 
ordinary business expenses, relying on an established line of prece-
dent 115 and an independent analysis of section 2119.116 As the dis-
sent inFaura pointed out, the legislative history of section 2119 does 
not support the majority's broad interpretation, which held that sec-
tion 2119 applies to authors as well as publishers. 117 However, both 
the dissenting and concurring judges felt that the precedent cited by 
the majority was sufficient to support the holding. 118 The Tenth Cir-
cuit also adhered to this line of precedent in Snyder v. United 
States. 119 Neither of these cases, however, analyzes the purposes un-
derlying sections 162 and 263, nor do they justify their holdings in 
Report was prepared after passage of the bill in its final form, the intent they express ought be 
controlling. See note 107 supra. Thus, Congress' preference as to the treatment of prepublica-
tion expenses is at best unclear. 
llO. See, e.g., Letter Ruling 8201015 (Sept. 21, 1981). I.R.C. § 6llO(i)(3) (1976) provides 
that these letters may not be cited as precedent. 
ll l. News Release IR-1575 (Mar. 17, 1976). 
112. Letter Ruling 8201015, supra note 110. The IRS's position in this matter seems rea-
sonable. Section 2119 by its terms protects only those with consistent practices, and the burden 
is always on the taxpayer to show entitlement to a deduction. See, e.g., Walker v. Commis-
sioner, 362 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1966) (deficiency assessment entitled to presumption of correct-
ness; burden on taxpayer to show greater deduction permissible). See generally l B. BIITKER, 
supra note 23, ~ 20.l.9, at 20-23 to -26. 
113. The IRS seems to be uncertain about what "consistency" requires. In Letter Ruling 
8201015, supra note 110, the agent contended that all prepublication expenditures had to be 
treated identically for consistency to be achieved. The writer of the letter concluded that 
"[s]uch internal consistency with respect to all other expenses is not necessary, however; the 
taxpayer need only treat each particular type of expense in a consistent manner." 
l 14. 73 T.C. 849 (1980). 
115. See 73 T.C. at 852-57; notes 89-97 supra and accompanying text. 
116. See 73 T.C. at 859; notes 107 & 109 supra. 
ll7. See 73 T.C. at 864-67 (Chabot, J., dissenting); note 107 supra. 
118. 73 T.C. at 862-63 (Tannenwald, Nims, JJ., concurring); 73 T.C. at 863 (Chabot, J., 
dissenting). Although Judge Chabot concluded that precedent supported the majority's hold-
ing, he thought that the court should have overruled such precedent. 73 T.C. at 863. 
119. 674 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1982). The taxpayer had expenses for photographic equip-
ment and for trips to talk with publishers about a planned book of photographs. In dicta, the 
court suggested that the taxpayer's expenses in creating the book would be deductible, citing 
Faura. 674 F.2d at 1365. The court did not discuss§ 2ll9. 
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terms of "clear reflection of income" principles. 120 
In Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 121 the Seventh 
Circuit denied a business expense deduction for prepublication costs, 
pointing out that none of the cases cited as precedent offered a ra-
tionale for immediate deduction. 122 Instead, the court relied on the 
"clear reflection of income" principles discussed in Idaho Power .123 
Since the payments were for the creation of a book intended to yield 
Britannica income over a period of years, the court had "no doubt" 
that the payments ought to be capitalized. 124 
The court was, however, disturbed by the Faura and Snyder 
holdings. Rather than reject them outright, Judge Posner distin-
guished these cases on two grounds. First, he found that the specific 
expenses in question were not ordinary expenses because not recur-
rent to Britannica and thus could not be immediately deductible 
even if other prepublication expenses were. 125 Second, Judge Posner 
attempted to limit Faura to a situation where the production of a 
series of assets would render allocation of expenses among them so 
technically complex as to be virtually impossible. 126 In other words, 
the Britannica court read Faura as a concession to administrative 
120. See notes 12-26 supra and accompanying text. 
121. 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982). 
122. 685 F.2d at 215. Among the cases cited as precedent wereFaura, Snyder, and the line 
of cases on which they relied. See notes 89-97 supra and accompanying text. 
123. 685 F.2d at 214 ("The object of sections 162 and 263 of the Code, read together, is to 
match up expenditures with the income they generate."). For a discussion of Idaho Power, see 
notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text. 
124. 685 F.2d at 214. 
125. 685 F.2d at 216-17. Britannica had made payments to another corporation for prepa-
ration of a manuscript to be published by Britannica, and had then deducted these payments 
as ordinary business expenses. 685 F.2d at 214. Normally, Britannica produced all its manu-
scripts in-house. Relying on a constricted version of the old "recurrent costs" standard, the 
court found that the payments were not "ordinary." The court's approach was "constricted" 
because the court looked only to the taxpayer's own practices, rather than to the industry as a 
whole. Cf. notes 30-32supra and accompanying text ("recurrent in the industry" test looks to 
the "normal" business response). The court's version of the "recurrent" test implies that any 
publisher who is consistent will have only ordinary business expenses, whether he purchases all 
his manuscripts, or creates them all in-house. Judge Posner apparently recognized that his use 
of the "recurrent" standard raised this problem, and emphasized that the consistency question 
was not before the court. 685 F.2d at 217 ("[W]e need not consider whether a conventional 
publisher should be permitted to deduct royalty advances made to its authors as current oper-
ating expenses, merely because those advances are for it recurring business expenses because 
its business is producing capital assets."). 
The "recurrent" standard is no longer in general use. See notes 30-32 supra and accompa-
nying text. However, assuming that the court correctly applied the "recurrent" standard, 
Britannica's payments still seem "ordinary" by many standards. Justice Cardozo pointed out 
that an expense might be ordinary though encountered by a taxpayer only once during his 
lifetime. See note 29 supra. Britannica had contracted out for the manuscript because it was 
short-staffed; even if the range of experience is limited to publishers who create manuscripts 
in-house, Britannica's action must surely be the ordinary response in a short-staffing situation. 
126. 685 F.2d at 216. Judge Posner noted that such allocation problems are more likely to 
arise with publishers than with authors. 685 F.2d at 215. 
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difficulties. 127 The court then pointed out that the payments by 
Britannica were "unambiguously identified" with a specific asset, 
and concluded that the administrative considerations of Faura were 
not relevant in the case at bar. 128 However, no language in Faura 
purports to limit its holding to technically complex situations. In-
deed, the author had produced only two manuscripts from the ex-
penses deducted;129 the expenses could have been easily allocated 
between the two. The Seventh Circuit's narrow reading of Faura, 
then, seems unjustified. 
Ultimately, judicial and administrative treatment of prepublica"" 
tion expenditures continues to be inadequate. Although Encyclopae-
dia Britannica began in the right place, by considering Idaho Power's 
"clear reflection of income" principles, the court went off course in 
its attempts to distinguish Faura. Regardless of whether Encyclo-
paedia Britannica's expenses should have been capitalized, 130 the 
"recurrent cost" test enunciated by the Seven,th Circuit and the 
court's reliance on an administrative burden rationale are mislead-
ing and poorly related to the court's basic "clear reflection of in-
come" premise. Moreover, the IRS has not taken any action to solve 
the dilemma. Despite the IRS's apparent intention to require most 
authors and publishers to capitalize their expenses, it has given no 
indication that regulations are forthcoming. 131 
III. APPLIED ANALYSIS OF PREPUBLICATION COSTS 
This part examines prepublication costs in light of the concepts 
developed in Part I, suggesting an analysis of the problem more prin-
127. At least some publishers must be able to allocate their costs among manuscripts, since 
the legislative history of§ 2119 indicates that the publishing industry has followed varied prac-
tices with respect to capitalization of costs. See note 109 supra. 
128. 685 F.2d at 216. 
129. 73 T.C. at 849-50. 
130. Cf. Part III-C infra (discussing proper treatment of publisher's expenses). 
131. The problem of prepublication expenditures has been the subject of a special IRS 
study since the suspension of Revenue Ruling 73-395. See News Release IR-1575 (Mar. 17, 
1976). Although § 2119 only requires regulations as to publishers, the Office of the Chief 
Counsel has advised against issuing any new revenue ruling applicable to authors until the 
study is complete. G.C.M. 37,557 (May 31, 1978). The IRS also has under study the possible 
applicability of I.R.C. § 280 (1982), which requires that, in the case of an individual taxpayer, 
production costs for films, books, records and similar property be deducted over the years in 
which the property is income-producing. Consideration of the anti-tax-shelter nature of this 
provision suggests that it properly applies only to purchasers of manuscripts and that the pro-
duction costs referred to are those of a publisher, not an author. See Gilleran, Amortization 
Shelters in Books, Records, Artwork, and Similar Property-Mirage or Oasis in the Tax Shelter 
JJesert?, 56 TAXES 695, 697 (1978). This position is supported by the relevant legislative his-
tory. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 49, 115, 
states that § 280's requirements apply to production costs and that "in the case of a book, 
principle production begins with the preparation of the material for publication." See gener-
ally Letter Ruling 7921008 (Jan. 29, 1979) (discussing the relationship between§ 280 of the 
Code and § 2119 of the Tax Reform Act). 
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cipled than any that has been developed by the courts or the IRS. 
Section A contends that not all prepublication expenditures are en-
compassed by the IRS's regulatory requirement that the taxpayer 
capitalize costs incurred in securing a copyright. Rather, this Regu-
lation properly covers only the direct costs of registration. As a re-
sult, the inquiry turns to the proper treatment of expenses other than 
registration costs. Section B examines the prepublication expendi-
tures of authors and concludes that authors receive income from the 
sale of services rather than the sale of an asset. This position is sup-
ported by the denial of capital gains treatment for the author's sale 
of his manuscript. Thus, an author should be allowed to deduct ex-
penses incurred in generating his or her fee. Finally, section C ex-
amines the prepublication expenditures of publishers, discussing the 
nature of the industry and its typical accounting practices, and con-
cludes that fixed costs and royalties must be capitalized and de-
ducted over a book's useful life. Running costs, however, are 
properly included in inventory. 
A. Manuscripts and Copyrights 
The regulations promulgated under section 263 require the capi-
talization of "[a]mounts expended for securing a copyright and 
plates, which remain the property of the person making the pay-
ments." 132 Since a copyright is a long-lived asset133 which at least 
theoretically benefits the holder in future years, 134 capitalization of 
this cost is necessary to achieve clear reflection of income. 135 The 
question remains, however, to what extent "amounts expended for 
securing a copyright" includes amounts expended to create a copy-
rightable manuscript. 136 
The IRS has historically equated the production of a manuscript 
with the securing of a copyright, forcing capitalization of all the costs 
132. Treas. Reg. § l.263(a)-2(b) (1958); see note 39 supra. 
133. Under the 1976 Copyright Act, a copyright endures from the time of creation of the 
work until SO years after the death of the author. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Under 
the 1909 Act, a copyright endured for 28 years from the time of publication. Act of Mar. 4, 
1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976)). 
134. In the absence of other evidence, a copyright may be depreciated over its legal life. 
Treas. Reg. § l.167(a)-6(a) (1956). The IRS allows publishers to depreciate over a shorter pe-
riod if they can demonstrate the shorter useful life. Rev. Ru!. 73-395, 1973-2 C.B. 87. The 
value, and hence the benefit, of a copyright is tied to the income-producing potential of the 
work which it protects, although many works have value (to their publishers) independent of 
the existence of copyright. For example, Charles Dickens' A Tale of Two Cities, long out of 
copyright, is valuable enough to be presently available in 16 editions. See l BooKs IN PRINT, 
1982-83 - AUTHORS 1179 (1982). 
135. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text. 
136. An argument can be made that where the IRS has meant to include creation costs in 
its pronouncement, it has used the phrase "producing and copyrighting." See, e.g., Rev, Ru!. 
73-395, 1973-2 C.B. at 87; l.T. 1287, 1-1 C.B. at 28. Since no mention of production is made in 
the regulations, the IRS must not have meant to include it. 
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of producing a book. 137 Presumably the IRS reasoned that because a 
manuscript is necessary to obtain a copyright, costs incurred in pro-
ducing the manuscript are necessary to securing the copyright. 
The IRS's position, however, is not unobjectionable. The lan-
guage of the regulation itself supports an argument against treating 
the costs of creation as part of the costs of securing a copyright. Sig-
nificantly, the regulation speaks of costs for "securing" a copyright. 
Since a copyright endures from the moment the manuscript is cre-
ated, 138 treatment of creation as a component of "securing" may 
seem like a logical step. However, the mere existence of a copyright 
does not secure it. To secure the copyright, and thus to obtain its 
benefit, the copyright must be registered. 139 Thus, the costs of "se-
curing" a copyright are really the costs of registration. 140 This result 
comports with the author's purpose in incurring various expenses, 
since only registration expenses are paid with the copyright in mind; 
creation expenses have as their end only the manuscript, which inci-
dentally gives rise to a copyright. 
The manuscript and the copyright are, furthermore, distinct as-
sets with potentially different tax consequences. With respect to cap-
italization, the important comparison is the span over which the 
137. See, e.g., Rev. Ru!. 73-395, 1973-2 C.B. 87 (permitting depreciation of cost of manu-
script over life of copyright); O.D. 966, 5 C.B. 155, 156 (1921) (cost of producing book is part 
of securing copyright). 
138. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). A manuscript is inherently a fixation in a tangible medium 
of a work of authorship. 
139. Neither registration nor deposit of copies with the Library of Congress is a condition 
of copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. §§ 407(a), 408(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Despite these express 
statements, registration is, in effect, a condition of copyright protection. Section 411 of the 
Copyright Act makes registration a prerequisite to any infringement action. 17 U.S.C. § 411 
(Supp. IV 1980). The existence of federal statutory copyright, whether secured or not, com-
pletely preempts any common law copyright. Thus, from the moment of fixation, the copy-
right holder's only remedies are statutory. See Gorman, An Overview ef the Copyright Act ef 
1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 856, 865 (1978); Note, Copyright and Privacy Protection ef Unpub-
lished Works-The Author's Dilemma, 13 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 351, 361-64 (1977). Fur-
ther, § 412 requires that registration take place before the infringement, if the copyright holder 
is to obtain the statutory damages or attorney's fees otherwise available to successful plaintiffs 
in copyright actions. Thus, effective protection of the copyright is dependent on registration. 
See Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 40 (1939) ("Without right of vindi-
cation a copyright is valueless."); Levine & Squires, Notice, Deposit and Registration: The Im-
portance ef Being Formal, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1232, 1261-63 (1977). 
The same conclusion follows under the operation of the 1909 Copyright Act. Although 
statutory copyright did not exist until publication of the work with proper copyright notice, 
common law copyright, which existed from creation of the work, was unimpaired as to unpub-
lished works by the 1909 Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 2, IO (1976);see R. WINCOR & I. MAN-
DELL, COPYRIGHT, PATENTS & TRADEMARKS: THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL & 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 8-9 (1980). Statutory protection, then, existed only if the copyright was 
"secured" by registration. Thus, only the costs of registration were costs to secure copyright. 
140. The requirements for registration are set forth in§§ 408 and 409 of the 1976 Copy-
right Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408-409 (Supp. IV 1980). They prescribe deposit of a specified number 
of copies of the work, along with presentation of of the application for registration and the 
filing fee. Currently, the fee is ten dollars. 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(c)(2) (1983). Thus, the costs of 
registration should be minimal. · 
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asset produces income. A copyright is a bundle of legal rights, con-
ferred as much for the public's benefit as for the author's. 141 A copy-
right has a legally determinable life. 142 Whatever its actual useful 
life, which may be much shorter, 143 a copyright's income potential is 
always bounded by its legal lifespan. A manuscript, however, knows 
no such legal bounds - its income-producing life is potentially infi-
nite. Although such long-lived manuscripts are rare, 144 their exist-
ence demonstrates that the benefits produced by a manuscript are 
not necessarily exhausted within the period of the copyright's exist-
ence. This difference in potential useful life should imply a different 
tax treatment of expenses incurred in creating those lives ( or, at least, 
a separate treatment). Thus, although the IRS may be justified in 
requiring capitalization of the costs of registering - and thus secur-
ing - a copyright, this requirement implies nothing about the 
proper tax treatment of other prepublication expenses. 
B. Prepublication Expenses of Authors 
The prepublication expenditures of authors fall into two groups: 
the costs of creation and the costs of obtaining publication. This di-
vision is natural because the costs of creation go toward completing 
the work that is the product of the author's literary efforts. At the end 
of this creation phase, the author's efforts will have produced a po-
tentially valuable manuscript. The costs of this phase may include 
research, office supplies, depreciation on equipment, and steno-
graphic assistance, among other things. The costs of obtaining pub-
lication generally add little to the potential value of the manuscript, 
since they involve only minor revision. In a sense, however, the costs 
of obtaining publication are the costs of realizing the potential value 
141. Copyright law promotes the public benefit by reconciling two conflicting public inter-
ests. First, the public is interested in the free dissemination of new ideas. It would be against 
this interest "that a masterpiece should be susceptible of permanent monopoly ••.• " R. 
W1NCOR & I. MANDELL, supra note 139, at 7. However, there is a conflicting interest in en-
couraging new ideas by rewarding the author. Copyright law reconciles these two public inter-
ests by rewarding the author with a set of rights but limiting the term of years for the rights. 
Id At common law, copyright existed in perpetuity, giving authors and publishers control 
over the dissemination of their work. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 20 I (K.B. 
1769). Because of the public's interest in the free dissemination of ideas, however, courts have 
held that once an author avails himself of statutory copyright protection, the statute's limited 
term extinguishes the perpetual common law right. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 223, 8 Pet. 
591 (1834); Donaldsons v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1114);seea/so Interna-
tional News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,248 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing in favor of the public's interest in free dissemination); Chamberlain v. Feldman, 300 N.Y. 
135, 89 N.E.2d 863 (1949) (where work had never been published, and thus statutory copyright 
had never come into effect, common law copyright protected the work in perpetuity). See 
generally B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 9-37 (1967) (on the history of 
copyright). 
142. See note 133 supra. 
143. See note 134 supra. 
144. See note 134supra. 
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of the manuscript, since, without publication, the manuscript will 
never produce any income. The costs of obtaining publication in-
clude, among other things, money paid for copying, postage, travel 
to meet with publishers, and agent's fees. 145 
l. Creation Costs 
Under the principles developed in Part I of this Note, the au-
thor's creation costs seem to be clear instances of capital expenditure 
- that is, they create property having a useful life substantially be-
yond the taxable year. 146 However, one can argue that that the au-
thor is not receiving income from the asset he produces, but rather 
from a sale of his services. If the author is indeed selling services, 
then his costs ought to be expensed - that is, deducted in the year 
they are incurred - despite the fact that he receives his compensa-
tion in the future. 147 
In creating a manuscript, an author may have many actual ex-
penditures - for example, travel, research 148 and office expenses, the 
cost of supplies, depreciation on equipment, 149 and stenographic 
help. 150 Yet the author's major investments in the manuscript are his 
time and labor.151 In essence, the author's creativity and labor have 
produced the book; all other costs, substantial though they may be, 
145. The vast majority of books accepted by trade publishers are placed through literary 
agents. J. DESSAUER, BOOK PUBLISHING: WHAT IT Is, WHAT IT DOES 31 (1974). In other 
branches of the industry, most books received are either unsolicited, or were specifically con-
tracted for by the publisher. See note 168 iefra. 
146. See Part I-A supra. Of course, not all, or even most, books are resounding successes. 
On average, only 30% of new titles are profitable, with another 30% breaking even and the 
remaining 40% showing a loss. B. COMPAIGNE, THE BOOK INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION 20 
(1978). In general, scholarly works and textbooks will have longer useful lives than trade 
books. See note 87 supra. 
147. Certainly this is true of authors who report their income on the cash basis, a method 
of accounting that actually contemplates mismatching of expense and income. One widely 
accepted definition of "income," is that known as the Haig-Simons definition: "income equals 
personal consumption plus accumulation of wealth over a stated period ohime." Kahn, supra 
note 17, at 3; see H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). The cash method of 
accounting is expressly recognized as an exception to this definition, since it allows taxpayers 
in effect to defer recognition of income. See Kahn, supra note 17, at 9-10. That the cash 
method permits authors to defer recognition of income should not be taken to prohibit them 
from deducting their expenses in what would otherwise be the proper year. 
148. I.R.C. § 174(a)(I) (1982) permits an election to treat research and experimental ex-
penditures in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business as current expenses rather than 
as capital expenditures. However, Treas. Reg.§ l.174-2(a)(I) (1957) provides that "research in 
connection with literary, historical, or similar projects" is not included in the election. 
149. If authors are required to capitalize the costs of producing their manuscripts, the 
lda/ro Power doctrine would mandate that depreciation on equipment such as typewriters be 
included in that cost. See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text. In addition to the expense 
of typewriters, many authors now use word processors. See McDowell, Pub/is/ring: From 
Word Processor lo a Book, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1983, at 21, col. I. 
150. The Regulations specifically allow the deduction of similar expenses by professionals. 
See Treas. Reg.§ 1.162-6 (1958). 
151. See Shine, supra note 73, at 446. 
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are subordinate to the actual labor of writing. This suggests that pay-
ments received by the author from publishers are more in the nature 
of compensation than of gain from the sale of an asset. Clearly, the 
author's income derives from his input oflabor, rather than from the 
value of the materials. 152 
The characterization of royalties as compensation rather than as 
gain from the sale of an asset comports with the non-capital gains 
treatment of the sale. Under section 1221(3)153 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, manuscripts are not capital assets while in the hands of 
the author, and thus are not eligible for capital gains treatment. 154 
This result follows from the purposes of the capital gains provisions 
and the congressional determination that the "personal efforts" in-
volved in producing a literary work do not fall within the scope of 
those purposes. Although the propriety of the capital gains provi-
sions is hotly debated, 155 there is some agreement that their basic 
aim, though blurred by amendments, is directed toward invest-
ment .156 Thus, profits attributable to personal effort are properly de-
152. Any value the manuscript has beyond the value of its materials must be due to the 
addition of labor. The value of the author's labor is dependent on the income the manuscript 
can be expected to produce. This is particularly clear in the case of authors whose compensa-
tion is directly tied to the income they produce through the device of royalties. 
1~3. I.R.C. § 1221 (1982) provides in part: 
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by the taxpayer 
(whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include-
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, 
or similar property , held by-
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property, 
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer for whom 
such property was prepared or produced, or 
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined, for pur-
poses of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or part by reference to 
the basis of such property in the hands of a taxpayer described in subparagraph 
(A) or (B). 
154. See I.R.C. § 1222 (1982). All capital gains and losses are defined in terms of capital 
assets. 
155. See, e.g., Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247 
(1957). 
156. United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 56-57 (1965); Commissioner v. 
Gillette Motor Transp., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960); Holt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 687, 690-91 
(9th Cir. 1962); Bellamy v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 487, 497-98 (1965); 3B J. MERTENS, THE 
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION§ 22.11 at 85 (J. Doheny ed., rev. vol. 1980) ("Presuma-
bly what remains, after such noncapital assets have been carved out, is investment property."); 
cf. Com Prod. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955) ("The preferential treatment 
provided by [the capital gains provisions] applies to transactions in property which are not the 
normal source of business income."); Miller, Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal 
Effort: Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L.J. I, I (1954) (discussing the "paradox that 
the capital gains tax often applies to gains not from an investment of capital but from personal 
effort"). The arguments typically advanced in favor of the capital gains provisions reflect this 
emphasis on investment. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 155, at 266 ("Full taxation of gains would 
tend to retard investment by enterprises, discourage risk-taking, and interfere with the mobility 
of capital."). 
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nied capital gains treatment. 157 In specifically excepting literary 
compositions from the definition of capital assets, 158 Congress has 
determined that the author's conversion of his services into a product 
is insufficient to regard profits from the sale of that product as profit 
due to investment. 159 Rather, the author's profit is attributable to 
personal effort and thus should be taxed at ordinary income rates. 160 
If the author's profit on the sale of his manuscript is taxed as 
ordinary income because his profit is essentially the product of per-
sonal effort, then the sale of the manuscript must be characterized as 
a sale of services, rather than as a sale of property, at least for capital 
gains purposes. Although section 1221 is a characterization provi-
sion, whereas sections 162 and 263 are timing provisions, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the characterization of the transaction as 
a sale of services should carry over to the timing provisions as well. 
If the author's activity is characterized as the performance of serv-
ices, then his expenses must be the expenses of performing services, 
rather than the costs of constructing an asset. Since section 162 per-
mits an immediate deduction of the expenses of performing services, 
157. The many provisions of the Code which do allow capital gains treatment of profit 
from personal effort, e.g., I.R.C. § 1235 (1982) (sale of patents), are not to the contrary. These 
provisions are not based on theoretical grounds but on policy. See Miller, supra note 156, at 82 
("No intention has been expressed by Congress or the courts to extend the capital gains tax to 
personal service income as such. Congress has merely approved some instances of this exten-
sion as 'incentives' and relief from 'unduly harsh' taxation.") (footnotes omitted). The 
favorable treatment of patents as compared to that of copyrights is a topic beyond the scope of 
this Note. For a discussion of the discrimination in the Code between patents and cppyrights, 
see Pilpel, Developments in Tax Law Affecting Copyrights in 1954, 33 TAXES 271 (1955); Note, 
supra note 73. 
158. Prior to the addition of§ 1221(3) in 1950, Pub. L. No. 814 § 210, 53 Stat. 50 (1950), 
professional authors were denied capital gains treatment on the ground that manuscripts were 
"primarily for sale to customers" in the_ ordinary course of business. See Fields v. Commis-
sioner, 14 T.C. 1202, 1214-16 (1950), ajfd., 189 F.2d 950 (2d Cir. 1951). Amateurs, however, 
received capital gains treatment. See, e.g., Herwig v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 384, 390-92 
(Ct. Cl. 1952). Section 1221(3) was prompted by the capital gains treatment received by then-
General Eisenhower on the sale of his memoirs of WWII. Although § 1221(3) was added to 
remove the loophole for amateur authors, there can be little doubt that the exclusion of profes-
sional authors from capital gains treatment was actually based on a "personal efforts" ground 
rather than on the "primarily for sale to customers" exclusion. Both the House and Senate 
Reports on the addition of§ 1221(3) indicate a concern that capital gains treatment should not 
be given to profit from "personal effort." See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 54 
(1950), reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 380, 421; S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1950), 
reprinted in 1950-2 C.B. 483, 515. 
159. See Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 985, 
1001-02 (1956) ("[P]rofits attributable to creative 'personal efforts' are not regarded as entitled 
to capital gain treatment. This is, presumably, a result of the realization that salaries, wages, 
commissions, and professional fees are on the ordinary income side . . . and the feeling that 
profits coming from other personal efforts belong with these classes of income.") (footnote 
omitted). 
160. In his section on personal services income, Marvin Chirelstein states that "the income 
received by an inventor or an artist from the transfer of a patent or copyright fairly plainly 
belongs to the class of ordinary receipts. The principal element of value in either case derives 
from personal effort .... " M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 19.01, at 320; see also Pilpel, 
Tax Law Affecting Copyrights: 1954-56, 35 TAXES 76 (1957). 
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regardless of the time of compensation, the author's creation costs 
should be allowed as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 161 
2. Costs of Obtaining Publication 
Once the author has created his manuscript, he must publish or 
arrange for the sale of his product to obtain any income. He may 
incur costs for photocopying, mailing, travel to visit publishers, and 
agent's fees. 162 If the author is, in effect, attempting to sell his serv-
ices, 163 then the costs of obtaining publication are analogous to the 
costs of job-seeking. Assuming that one is established in the trade or 
business of writing, these costs may be expensed whether or not the 
search for employment is successful. 164 
161. The ordinary income characterization of authors' profits apparently motivaled Sena-
tor Ribicoff's attempt to place authors under the protection of§ 2 I I 9 of the Tax Reform Act of 
1976: 
What makes Revenue Ruling 73-395 all the more unfair is the fact that while it re-
quires expenditures to be depreciated, section 1221(3) of the Code prohibits authors from 
treating their output as "capital assets." 
In other words, without the amendment that I am proposing, authors will be taxed at 
the higher "ordinary income" rates while they will only be able to depreciate expenses. 
This is patently unfair. 
122 CONG. REC. I 1,296 (1976) (statement of Sen. Ribicofl). 
Section 162 provides a deduction only for those carrying on a trade or business. Authors 
not engaged in a trade or business would have to show that they intended to produce income if 
they wish to qualify for a deduction under§ 212. On the difficulties of establishing oneself as 
in the trade or business of being an artist, see T. CRAWFORD, THE WRITER'S LEGAL GUIDE 
185-94 (1977); R. DUFFY, ART LAW 224-30 (1977); A TAX GUIDE FOR ARTISTS AND ARTS 
ORGANIZATIONS 45-56 (H. Lidstone ed. 1979). 
162. Should he be unsuccessful in obtaining publication, the author may either abandon 
the manuscript, or seek publication through a vanity press or printer. See T. CRAWFORD, 
supra note 161, at 139-40 (discussing publication methods other than via a commercial pub-
lisher). Abandonment will pose a problem of proof if capitalization is required, particularly 
since interest may be shown in the early manuscript if later manuscripts prove more successful. 
Publication by a vanity press involves the author's assumption of the costs of publication 
through an initial payment, usually determined on a per page basis. Although vanity press 
contracts typically provide high royalties, this practice is deceptive, since low sales mean that 
authors virtually never recover their initial investment. T. CRAWFORD, supra note 161, at 141-
45 (only 10% of investments are covered by sales). 
163. See notes 146-61 supra and accompanying text. 
164. Rev. Ru!. 78-93, 1978-1 C.B. 38. The expenses of one already established in a busi-
ness in seeking new employment are deductible on the theory that an employee is engaged in 
offering services to many employers, not simply his current one. Rev. Ru!. 75-120, 1975-1 C.B. 
55. One seeking employment for the first time, however, is apparently not considered to be 
"carrying on" a business, as required by § 162(a), so no deduction is allowed. 
Alternatively, the costs of obtaining publication may be analogized to normal business 
operating expenses, since the business of writing necessarily involves such attempts. If the 
writer's business can be said to have begun with the writing of his work, rather than its publi-
cation, then the operating expense analogy will also solve the problem of first-time authors. 
See Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 905 n.4, 906-07 (4th Cir.), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965) (pre-operating expenses of TV 
station are not deductible; operations begin when "the business has begun to function as a 
going concern and performed those activities for which it was organized"); Lee, A Blend of Old 
Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 TAX L. REV. 347, 454-61 (1974) (dis-
cussing pre-operating/operating distinction). 
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C. Prepublication Expenditures of Publishers 
The modem book publisher functions differently from virtually 
every other manufacturer. Although he ultimately produces goods 
for sale, the publisher's main concern is the creation and develop-
ment of new products.165 Few publishers care to print the same 
books year after year. 166 And, while most manufacturers have some 
interest in the improvement of old products and the development of 
new, none are as dependent on the constant introduction of new 
products as publishers are. 
The prepublication work of publishers is divided into two 
phases.167 First, the publishers develop new products. This task in-
volves the selection of manuscripts submitted for publication, the de-
velopment of ideas for creation of in-house projects, 168 the editing of 
165. In 1979, 36,112 new titles were published, along with 9,070 new editions of previously 
published works. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1980, at 595 [hereinafter cited as STATISTICS]. In 1977, 1745 
book publishers issued 42,780 new books and editions. Id. at 590, 595. Of 106,000 employees 
in book printing and publishing, only 51,000 were production workers -ie., involved in the 
book manufacturing process - a low percentage compared with other manufacturing indus-
tries. See STATISTICS, supra, at 816-17. 
166. Most publishers maintain a "backlist" of titles previously published that continue to 
sell year after year. See J. DESSAUER, supra note 145 at 30. Once a manuscript has reached the 
stage where plates have been created, the cost to the publisher of a new printing is relatively 
low. See H. BOHNE & H. VAN IERSSEL, PuBLISHING: THE CREATIVE BUSINESS 9 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as H. BOHNE]. The culture of publishing is such, however, that most publishers 
want to bring new titles before the public. There are two major reasons for this phenomenon, 
which ultimately leads to the publication of twice as many titles as can be successfully mar-
keted. See J. DESSAUER,supra note 145, at 36. First, the uncertainty of the market leads many 
publishers to publish as many titles as possible, in the hope that one or more will be that 
season's "blockbuster." See id. at 36-38. Second, many publishers feel constrained (or even 
desire) to publish so-called "conscience books" - books certain not to recover their costs, but 
which are of particular cultural merit. See L. COSER, C. KADUSHIN & w. POWELL, BooKS: 
THE CULTURE AND COMMERCE OF PUBLISHING 15-16 (1982) [hereinafter cited as L. CosER]. 
See generally A. BLOND, THE PUBLISHING GAME (1971). Of course, for every conscience book 
published, a publisher must produce one or more profitable books in order to cover his loss. 
167. These two phases cover only the prepublication operations of a publisher. The typical 
publishing operation is actually divided into five areas: editorial, production, marketing, ful-
fillment, and administration. The editorial area encompasses both the selection task (reading 
of submitted manuscripts and creation of projects) and the preparation task (traditional edit-
ing, proofreading, etc.). Production includes the planning and design of the physical book, 
choice of materials and supervision of the printing process. Marketing covers advertising, pro-
motion and general publicity. Fulfillment involves the processing of orders, credit control, and 
maintenance of sales and inventory records. Administration is a general category covering 
fiscal and personnel management, corporate planning and policy, and accounting. See J. DES-
SAUER, supra note 145, at 26-27. Generally accepted accounting principles would allow the 
immediate deduction of marketing and fulfillment costs, because they are operating expenses 
rather than manufacturing costs. See H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, supra note 13, at 497. The 
regulations specifically recognize that advertising and other selling costs qualify as business 
expenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-l(a), T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51, 52. Administrative costs are 
generally overhead that cannot be assigned to any specific function. This general overhead 
may be deducted immediately, as it relates to a specific time period, rather than to a specific 
product. See note 183 infra. For the treatment of editorial overhead, see notes 180-83 infra 
and accompanying text. 
168. True in-house projects are proposed, written and edited by employees of the pub-
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manuscripts accepted for publication, and the planning and design 
of the physical book. In other words, the publisher must obtain, 
either through in-house creation or through purchase and in-house 
development, the finished work that will then be reproduced for 
sale. 169 The second task is the actual manufacturing of the books 
themselves. The costs of these two prepublication functions - crea-
tion and manufacture - must be accounted for differently; the first 
function is the process of acquiring an asset with a useful life beyond 
the taxable year, whereas the second is the process of producing 
goods for sale.17° 
Four types of cost are associated with the publisher's creative 
function: acquisition costs, editorial selection costs, editorial prepa-
ration costs and plant costs. 171 Since these costs go to the acquisition 
and development172 of assets having a useful life beyond the taxable 
year, they must be capitalized unless the publisher can demonstrate 
lisher. Most reference works are prepared in this manner, as are many textbooks. In addition, 
several segments of the industry, notably professional books and textbooks, rely on in-house 
ideas, which are then contracted out to external authors. See J. DESSAUER, supra note 145, at 
54, 62-63. 
169. In accounting terms, the completed manuscript is a non-current asset - that is, one 
whose value extends over a fairly lengthy period of time. Depreciable assets are specifically 
excluded from current assets. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN No. 43, ch. 3, § A, ~ 6, 
reprinted in FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS AS OF JUNE 
I, 1981, at 13 [hereinafter cited as ARB No. 43]. The books produced for sale are current 
assets, because publishers expect to realize their value in cash within a relatively short period 
of time. Sees. NOVAK, ACCOUNTING DESK BOOK 58-60 (5th ed. 1977). Although publishers 
acquire manuscripts and copyrights, they are not barred by § 1221(3) from treating those 
properties as capital assets. Publishers who buy the rights to original manuscripts and those 
who contract out for books are obviously not within the "personal efforts" language of 
§ 1221(3)(A), nor is their basis in the property determined by reference to the author's. See P. 
GITLIN & W. WOODWARD, TAX ASPECTS OF PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS AND TRADEMARKS 31 
(1960); J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION§ 1221:5 (J. Doheny ed. 1983). 
Even works produced in-house are not excluded from capital gains treatment by§ 1221(3), at 
least where the copyright is held by a corporation. Rev. Ru!. 55-706, 1955-2 C.B. 300, super-
seded on other grounds, Rev. Rul. 62-141, 1962-2 C.B. 182. 
170. Failure to make the suggested distinction would lead to treatment of all costs directly 
traceable to production of the manuscript and book as manufacturing cost, which would be 
considered cost of inventory. This result would be incorrect for books which went into more 
than one printing, since the costs of developing the asset would be spread only over the life of 
the first printing, rather than over the life of the asset. 
171. These are the costs of the editorial department and part of the costs of the production 
department. See note 167 supra. Plant costs include nonrecurring production costs - such as 
typesetting, design costs, and plates - and artwork supplied by the publisher. See H. BOHNE, 
supra note 166, at 6-7; J. DESSAUER,.rupra note 145, at 170. For the proper treatment of plant 
costs, see notes 191-94 in.fro and accompanying text. 
172. Both tax practice and accepted accounting principles require that development costs 
be considered part of the costs of a non-current asset. See Mt. Morris Drive-In Theatre Co. v. 
Commissioner, 25 T.C. 272 (1955), ajfd., 238 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1956) (holding that where the 
need for a drainage system was obvious at the time original construction of a drive-in theater 
began, the cost of the drainage system was part of the cost of the theater and had to be capital-
ized); M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 12, ~ 6.02, at 107-08; cf. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD 
OPINION No. 17 - ACQUISITION OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS ~ 24, reprinted in FINANCIAL Ac-
COUNTING STANDARDS: ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS AS OF JUNE I, 1981, at 270 (costs of 
developing intangible assets which are not easily identifiable [such as goodwill] should be de-
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that some other method of accounting will clearly reflect income.I73 
Acquisition costs include advances, royalties, and flat fees paid to 
authors not on the publisher's payroll.I74 They represent the 
purchase price paid by the publisher to obtain publication rights to 
ducted when incurred). See generally S. NOVAK, supra note 169, at 70-72 (requiring capitaliza-
tion of alterations needed to make building available for purpose for which acquired). 
173. See notes 49-59 supra and accompanying text. For purposes of valuing a self-con-
structed asset, accountants generally divide costs into three types: direct materials cost, direct 
labor cost, and factory overhead. The sum of the direct costs is the prime cost; addition of 
indirect overhead costs yields the full or absorption cost. See H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, supra 
note 13, at 497. 
The three basic methods of valuing self-constructed assets take these costs into account 
differently. See 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 948, 953 n.38 (1974). The prime cost method requires 
capitalization only of direct costs. This method has been specifically rejected for inventory 
valuation by both the Tax Court and the accounting profession because of its failure to clearly 
reflect income. See Coors v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 368, 394 (1973), affd sub nom. Adolph 
Coors Co. v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); 
Photo-Sonics v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 926 (1964), affd, 357 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1966); ARB 
No. 43, ch. 4, ~ 5,supra note 169, at 17-18; IL. SEIDLER & D. CARMICHAEL, ACCOUNTANTS' 
HANDBOOK 18-9 (6th ed. 1981). For the same reason, it should be unacceptable for asset-
valuing purposes. 
The full absorption costing method requires capitalization of all direct and overhead costs 
attributable to acquisition of a non-current asset. This method is accepted for both accounting 
and tax purposes. See Coors, 60 T.C. at 394; Oberman Mfg. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 471 
(1967); ARB No. 43, ch. 4, ~ 5, supra note 169, at 16. 
The direct costing method provides a middle ground between prime and full absorption 
costing by dividing indirect overhead costs into fixed and variable components. Fixed costs 
are those which do not vary with the production run; variable costs are those which can be 
expected to increase as volume of production increases. See H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, supra 
note 13, at 505-07. Under a direct costing system, direct costs and variable indirect overhead 
costs are capitalized, or charged to the product. Fixed indirect overhead costs are charged as 
period costs and immediately deducted. See IL. SEIDLER & D. CARMICHAEL,supra, at 18-57; 
2 id. at 33-54 to -58. The acceptability of direct costing is debatable. Although many account-
ants favor direct costing, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants seems to dis-
approve of the method. See 2 id at 33-58 to -59. In Fort Howard Paper Co., 49 T.C. 275 
(1967), the Tax Court approved the taxpayer's direct costing system, but apparently only be-
cause of the unique facts of the case - no fixed overhead costs were incurred, so the direct 
costs method produced the same results as the full absorption method. See Coors, 60 T.C. at 
396-97 (holding Fort Howard to its facts). Seidler and Carmichael conclude that direct costing 
is generally unacceptable to both the AICPA and the IRS. 2 L. SEIDLER & D. CARMICHAEL, 
supra, at 33-58. 
174. Standard author's royalties for fiction have been estimated at 10% on the first 5000 
copies, 12.5% on the next 2500 copies, 15% on all copies over 7500. The rate is generally 
computed on the basis of the catalogue retail price, rather than the publisher's selling price, 
which is often much lower. See I A. LINDEY, ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS 
I 77 (2d ed. 1983). 
When a publisher creates a manuscript entirely in-house, there are no acquisition costs as 
such, since no outsider is involved in the creative process. Instead, the publisher pays his own 
employees to research and write the text. This situation seems to be directly covered by Idaho 
Power. See 418 U.S. I, 13 (1974) ("Construction-related expense items, such as tools, materi-
als, and wages paid construction workers, are to be treated as part of the cost of acquisition of 
a capital asset."); cf. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 214 (7th 
Cir. 1982). Since in-house preparation is most frequently employed for reference works, the 
completion of which may require years, capitalization of all these costs may impose a severe 
hardship on such publishers. See L. COSER, supra note 166, at 33-34 (statement of Charles 
Scribner, Jr., describing 10- and 15-year projects undertaken by his publishing house). Such 
hardship, however, can only be alleviated by Congress, should it choose on policy grounds to 
create an exception to the general capitalization principles. 
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the manuscript, and as such must be capitalized. 175 So long as ad-
vances are not deducted until earned, 176 deduction of royalties in the 
year earned represents a perfect matching of cost with income pro-
duced, since the percentage of total cost deducted in any one year is 
exactly proportional to the income produced in that year. 177 When a 
fl.at fee is paid, 178 the cost would have to be amortized over the 
book's useful life, rather than deducted in the year of payment. 
The editorial selection process involves the development of ideas, 
solicitation of books, and the reading of unsolicited manuscripts. 179 
The costs of this process are seemingly inallocable, since much of the 
editor's time will be devoted to projects that are ultimately re-
jected.180 Thus, these costs are generally charged to editorial over-
head,181 which is treated by most publishers as a business expense 
and immediately deducted.182 Since a portion of this overhead is 
undoubtedly related to the development of the manuscripts that are 
published, proper treatment may come down to the feasibility of al-
locating a portion of the editorial overhead to the books actually 
chosen for publication.183 
175. See generally S. NOVAK, supra note 169, at 70-72 (requiring capitalization of acquisi-
tion costs of non-current assets). 
176. Advances generally take the form of guarantees - that is, the publisher cannot re-
cover any portion not covered by royalties. See J. DESSAUER, supra note 145, at 33. Most 
publishers maintain a reserve to cover unearned advances, deducting additions to this reserve 
as though they were earned royalties. See id. at 172, 177. Ifno such reserve were maintained, 
and royalties were deducted only when earned, a loss deduction would have to be taken when 
the publisher determined that additional sales were no longer likely. 
177. A simple example will illustrate. Assume 5000 copies of a certain book are printed, 
with average income to the publisher of $10 per copy, a catalogue price of $20 and author's 
royalties of 10%. If500 copies are sold in Year 1, 2000 in Year 2, 1000 in Year 3, and 750 in 










Publisher's % Total Author's 
income income royalties 
$ 5,000 11.8% $1,000 
$20,000 47.0% $4,000 
$10,000 23.5% $2,000 
$ 7,500 17.6% $1,500 







Of course, this example ignores fluctuations in the publisher's selling price and does not 
provide for an accelerating royalty rate. Note, however, that this method of deduction func-
tions properly without any need to estimate useful life. 
178. See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britanica, 685 F.2d at 214. Flat fees are generally paid only 
for reference works, textbooks and mass-market paperbacks on timely subjects. The useful 
lives of the two former types are generally long and calculable with some degree of accuracy, 
The useful life of a topical mass-market paperback will generally be so short that in most 
cases, all expenditures will be deductible in the year incurred. 
179. See note 167 supra. 
180. See H. BOHNE, supra note 166, at 8. 
181. See id. at 8. 
182. J. DESSAUER, supra note 166, at 145, 171-73. 
183. The cases and the commentators generally recognize that overhead expense traceable 
to construction activity must be capitalized as a cost of the asset constructed. See Acer Realty 
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Editorial preparation costs are those associated with the process 
of bringing the text into final form. These activities include tradi-
tional editing, conferences with authors, and proofreading.184 The 
cost of editorial preparation is treated differently by different pub-
lishers.185 The Association of American Publishers recommends that 
preparation costs be treated as business expenses. 186 However, since 
preparation costs are more easily identified with particular books 
than are selection costs, some publishers treat them as a cost of in-
ventory, while others amortize them over the useful life of a series of 
books.187 Allocation of these costs to specific books, or at least to a 
line of books, does not seem too onerous a task. 188 If allocation is not 
Co. v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1942) (officer's salary attributable to construction 
supervision not ordinary and necessary expense but capital expenditure); Chevy Chase Motor 
Co., 78 T.C.M. (P-H) ~ 77,227 (1977) (president's salary capitalized to extent time was devoted 
to supervision of construction); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 962 (1976) 
(vacation and holiday pay, payroll taxes, etc., required to be capitalized); Coors v. Commis-
sioner, 60 T.C. 368 (1973) (method of accounting which charges all overhead to cost of goods 
sold does not clearly reflect income, capitalization of overhead required), qffd. sub nom. 
Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 
(1976); Rev. Rul. 67-75, 1967-1 C.B. 41 (vacation pay attributable to construction project must 
be capitalized); Rev. Rul. 66-373, 1966-2 C.B. 103 (insurance premiums attributable to con-
struction project must be capitalized); l B. B1TTKER, supra note 23, ~ 20.4.3, at 20-75 to -76; 
Fox & Jackson, Washington Tax Watch, 4 J. CORP. TAXN. 354 (1978). No agreement exists, 
however, as to the type of overhead costs which must be capitalized or as to the proper manner 
of allocating costs, such as salaries, that are only partly attributable to construction. See 
Chevy Chase Motor Co., 78 T.C.M. (P-H) ~ 77,227, at 77-948 (1977) (difficulty of allocating 
officer's salary); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 404 (1965), qffd., 373 F.2d 45 (10th 
Cir. 1967) (discussing formulas for allocation of executive salary); Fox & Jackson, supra, at 
355-56 (suggesting that overhead be capitalized only when there exists "a direct and close 
relationship between the expenditures and the construction project"). Compare Fort Howard 
Paper Co., 49 T.C. 275 (1967) (fixed overhead related to construction did not have to be capi-
talized because taxpayer's income was still clearly reflected), with Coors v. Commissioner, 60 
T.C. 368 (1973) (capitalization of all overhead required to properly reflect income). 
With respect to publishers, these cases may require capitalization of some administrative, 
as well as editorial, costs. See note 167 supra. In one situation, the IRS required capitalization 
of editorial staff, travel, translations, and copyrights, but allowed immediate deduction of costs 
incurred for an editorial board that generated broad policies for the company. The latter 
deduction was allowed because the costs could not be allocated to a specific publication. Letter 
Ruling 7602111060A (Feb. 11, 1976). One commentator has suggested that publishers allocate 
all overhead costs by establishing an hour-rate for each department (total costs, including such 
overhead as rent, heat, etc., divided by total available man-hours). Any hours worked on 
specific manuscripts would be charged at this rate and added to the cost of the book. Presuma-
bly any overhead cost not accounted for in this way would be expensed. See H. BOHNE, supra 
note 166, at 38. 
184. See note 167 supra. 
185. J. DESSAUER, supra note 145, at 172-73. 
186. See J. DESSAUER, supra note 145, at 172-73 (discussing AAP guidelines). 
187. J. DESsAUER, supra note 145, at 171. Those publishers who inventory editorial prep-
aration costs are, in essence, ignoring the creation-manufacture distinction. See note l70supra 
and accompanying text. 
188. As the IRS has pointed out, "[a]lthough each editor works on many manuscripts, he 
can work on only one manuscript at a time." Letter Ruling 7602111060A (Feb. 11, 1976). 
Since some publishers manage to allocate editorial expenses (see text at note 187 supra) and at 
least one commentator recommends allocation as a method of budget control, the burden can-
not be too unbearable. See H. BOHNE, supra note 166, at 8. Furthermore, publishers are ap-
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a problem, capitalization is required, since these are expenses to im-
prove and put into service an asset having a useful life beyond the 
taxable year. 189 
So-called "plant costs" include nonrecurring production costs -
such as typesetting, design costs and plates190 - and artwork sup-
plied by the publisher. 191 These costs are the final expenses of get-
ting the manuscript ready for printing. Some trade publishers write 
off plant costs at the time of publication, as part of the costs of sales, 
on the ground that the short useful life of trade books means that 
any attempt to stretch out deduction of plant costs would simply re-
sult in larger deductions in later months when inventories were writ-
ten down. 192 Other trade publishers and most elementary and high 
school textbook publishers, 193 however, amortize their plant costs. 194 
Since plant costs are easily identified to individual books, allocation 
presents no problem. 195 Thus, plant costs must also be capitalized, as 
costs of putting an asset into production, unless the publisher can 
demonstrate that the asset has a useful life of less than one year. 
Finally, the publisher's running costs are the costs associated 
with the manufacturing function - the costs of paper, printing and 
binding. 196 These costs are typically inventoried and deducted as a 
cost of sale. 197 The inventorying of running costs achieves clear re-
flection of income by deducting only the running cost of books actu-
parently able to make accurate forecasts of editorial expenses when determining the income-
producing potential of a given book. Preparatory editorial expense is a fixed cost - that is, it 
does not vary with the size of the production run. See Id.; B. CoMPAIGNE, THE BOOK INDUS· 
TRY IN TRANSITION 16-17 (1978); note 173 supra. Most publishers do a standard cost-volume-
profit analysis of each title, both before and after selection for publication, in order to set a 
reasonable selling price and printing run. See J. DESSAUER, supra note 145, at 35. Such analy-
sis requires knowledge of both fixed and variable costs, since the return possible on each book 
is dependent on the ratio of fixed to variable costs. See generally l L. SEIDLER & D. CARMI· 
CHAEL, supra note 173, at 15-28 to -33 (discussion of cost-volume-profit analysis and calcula-
tion of the break-even point). If publishers are able to estimate their editorial costs for 
planning purposes, surely they must be able to at least find an average cost for capitalization 
purposes. 
189. See note 172 supra. 
190. The regulations specifically require that the cost of plates be capitalized. Treas. Reg, 
§ l.263(a)-2(b) (1958); see note 39 supra. 
191. See note 171 supra. 
192. See J. DESSAUER,supra note 145, at 170-71. This argument, of course, is based on the 
assumption that plant costs, if not expensed, would be included in inventory. 
193. "Elhi" publishers are those that publish elementary and high school textbooks. J, 
DESSAUER, supra note 145, at 21. The other divisions of the publishing industry are trade, 
religious, professional, book clubs, mail order publications, mass market paperbacks, univer-
sity presses, college textbooks, standardized tests, and subscription reference. See id. al 18-22, 
194. Id. at 170-71, 184-86. 
195. By their very nature, the components of plant costs will be charged separately for each 
book. Plant costs are also fixed costs and, as such, calculated by the publisher in making his 
cost-volume-profit analysis. See note I 88 supra. 
196. See H. BOHNE, supra note 166, at 7. 
197. J. DESSAUER, supra note 145, at 171-72. 
December 1983) Note - Prepublication Expenses 571 
ally sold, rather than the entire investment in inventory. 198 This 
practice has been approved by the IRS. 199 
CONCLUSION 
The only satisfactory method of distinguishing business expenses 
and capital expenditures is based on the "clear reflection of income" 
principles that justify the distinction in the first place. In dealing 
with the prepublication expenses of publishers and authors, how-
ever, neither the courts nor the IRS has made adequate use of these 
principles. Proper analysis of an author's prepublication expenses 
reveals that the author is receiving income from the sale of services 
rather than from the production of an asset, and thus should be al-
lowed to deduct his expenses immediately. Those prepublication ex-
penses of the publisher that are associated with the creative function, 
however, must be capitalized unless the publisher can demonstrate 
either that his books have a short useful life or that some other ac-
counting practice clearly reflects income. Although this analysis re-
quires a separate determination of proper accounting methods for 
each publisher, it is the only theoretically defensible solution in an 
industry marked by the diversity of its members. 
198. Inventory not sold immediately becomes part of the publisher's backlist and is even-
tually remaindered or pulped. Until recently, publishers typically wrote down excess inven-
tory, carrying the books at reduced prices for tax purposes. The Supreme Court disapproved 
of this practice in the tool industry in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522 
(1979), a decision that the IRS specifically applied to publishers. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 80-60, 
1980-1 C.B. 97; Rev. Proc. 80-5, 1980-1 C.B. 284. These rulings have forced some publishers to 
reduce their backlists, putting many books out of print. See L. CosER, supra note 166, at 370-
71; cf. Brown & Roberts, Who's Burning the Books: The Thor Power Ruling Under A/lack, l I 
TAX NOTES 859, 862 (1980) (suggesting that post-Thor procedures might make the publishing 
industry more efficient). Although a number of bills designed to mitigate the impact of Thor 
Power were introduced in the Senate, none was ever reported out of committee. See Proce-
dural Difficulties Encountered by Smaller Business in Dealing with the IRS: Hearings on S. 2805 
Before the Subcomm. on Taxation, Financing, and Investment of the Senate Comm. on Small 
Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (bill to delay Rev. Rul. 80-60, 1980-1 C.B. 97); Miscella-
neous Tax Bills IX· Hearings on S. 1276 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debi Manage-
ment of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1981) (bill to permit small 
businesses to write down a percentage of excess inventory). When publishers decide to elimi-
nate inventory, the books are either remaindered or pulped. Hardback books which fail to sell 
are generally remaindered and sold at a fraction of their original price. See A. BLOND, supra 
note 166, at 71-72; J. DESSAUER,supra note 145, at 146. Although exact figures on remainders 
are uncertain, between 35% and 55% of the books ordered by bookstore chains are eventually 
returned to publishers. L. CosER, supra note 166, at 7. Approximately 50% of all mass-market 
paperbacks are returned to manufacturers and destroyed. Id. at 7; see A. BLOND, supra note 
166, at 72. 
199. See, e.g., Rev. Ru!. 73-395, 1973-2 C.B. 87. 
